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Proposed Revision of the
Minnesota Criminal Code
A proposed revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code is
currently before the state legislature. The product of a spe-
cial Advisory Committee created to study the problem, the
proposed code represents changes and consolidation only
in the present substantive criminal law; it does not attempt
to alter existing statutes on criminal procedure. Professor
Pirsig, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, has limited
this article to a discussion of the proposed revisions in four
areas: homicide, theft, sex offenses, and sentencing.
Maynard E. Pirsig*
In 1955, a commission was established by the Minnesota legis-
lature to deal with the broad problem of "juvenile delinquency,
crime, and correction."' One of the early acts of the Commission
was to set up a special Advisory Committee for the purpose of
dealing with the revision of the criminal law and procedure.2 The
Committee in the early stages of its work decided that it would
not undertake to make a study of criminal procedure, but would
concentrate its efforts on the study and revision of the substan-
tive criminal law. The work of this committee has now been
brought to a conclusion, and a proposed revised Minnesota Crim-
inal Code has been before the bench, the bar, and the public of
Minnesota for their consideration, suggestions, and criticism be-
fore submission of the final product to the 1963 legislative ses-
sion.
I. POLICIES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The proposed code consists of approximately 165 sections, re-
placing approximately 665 sections in the present criminal code.
This does not mean, however, that the substance of 500 sections
of the present code has been eliminated. The proposed revision
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 789, at 1222.
2. When the Legislative Commission was not continued in 1961, the
Governor made funds available for the Advisory Committee to conclude
the work on the revision of the Criminal Code.
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is a product of several basic policies pursued by the Advisory Com-
mittee. One was to recommend repeal of all obsolete and uncon-
stitutional provisions. For example, sections have been eliminat-
ed punishing engaging in a duel, challenging another to fight a
duel, or accepting a challenge to fight a duel.' Under the revi-
sion, if mutual combat does in fact take place, it will be dealt
with as a form of assault. Likewise the prohibition against tak-
ing "a larger proportion than one-eighth as toll for grinding and
bolting any wheat or other grain brought as a grist" to a custom
mil has no meaning under modern conditions. The same may
be said of requiring streetcars to be so constructed that the oper-
ator is protected from inclement weather.' Note also this interest-
ing, if not amusing, relic of the past:
Whoever rides or drives faster than a walk, upon any bridge, at each
end of which a conspicuous signboard is placed upon which is printed
the following words and figures: "$10 fine for riding or driving on this
bridge faster than a walk," shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and pun-
ished by a fine of $10, or by imprisonment in the county jail for
ten days, for each offense.6
Provisions such as these have not been retained in the revised code.
Some provisions have been deleted or modified to meet consti-
tutional objections. One such instance is section 623.25 of the
Minnesota Statutes, which undertakes to limit and control the use
of gift stamps on the part of merchants. This has been held un-
constitutional except insofar as the element of chance, and hence
of gambling, is involved.' Again, statutes such as section 617.72,
which prohibits the distribution to a minor of publications made
up of "criminal news, police reports, accounts of criminal deeds,
or pictures or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime," have
been held unconstitutional on the ground of indefiniteness as to
3. MINN. STAT. §§ 619.46-.50 (1961).
4. MINN. STAT. § 614.51 (1961).
5. MINN. STAT. § 614.56 (1961).
6. MINN. STAT. § 616.24 (1961). For other examples, see MINN. STAT.
§ 614.65 (1961):
Any person within the state who manufactures, sells, gives to any one,
or uses any cigarette containing any substance foreign to tobacco shall
be punished by a fine of not more than $50.00, or imprisonment
in a county jail for not more than 30 days;
MINN. STAT. § 617.61 (1961):
All persons under the age of 21 years are prohibited from playing
pool or billiards or cards in any saloon or room connected therewith
or in any restaurant or public place of amusement in which tobacco,
confectionery, or drinks of any kind, except water, are in any man-
ner disposed of . ..
7. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 110 Minn.
378, 126 N.W. 120 (1910).
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meaning.8 Sections 612.06 to 612.09 of the Minnesota Statutes,
which undertake to punish various acts of disloyalty, are undoubt-
edly unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court
decision holding that federal legislation has pre-empted the field
of sedition against the United States.' Hence, the correspondiig
revised provisions are limited to acts directed against the state.10
A number of present criminal statutes make a given fact prima
facie evidence of another fact essential to the commission of a
crime such as the intent to defraud. In State v. Higgin," the trial
court instructed the jury in a criminal trial for forgery that in-
tent to defraud "may be presumed" from the fact that defendant
signed the payee's name unless the presumption has been rebutted by
the evidence. In holding this instruction erroneous, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court said:
[Where specific intent is an essential element of the offense charged,
it can never be presumed, at least in the sense that it must be found
from a given state of facts in the absence of countervailing or rebutting
evidence. Like every other essential element of the crime, specific in-
tent must be established beyond reasonable doubt or be reasonably
deducible from the evidence. It may not rest on a presumption. As
previously mentioned, intent to defraud may be, and normally is, in-
ferred from the established circumstances. But no matter how incon-
trovertible the evidence of the intent to defraud may be, the court
may not declare that the evidence establishes such intent."-
The decision appears to permit, however, a provision that a given
fact is sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find by inference
a second fact such as intent. Hence, in the revision such language
has been substituted for the present use of presumption or prima
facie case.13
Another basic policy of the Advisory Committee was to con-
fine the proposed code to those crimes that are of general ap-
plication and to transfer to other chapters those sections dealing
with the regulation and control of particular and limited activi-
ties. During the present century, a large number of regulatory
measures have been adopted by the state and federal governments
8. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
9. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
10. See PROPOsED MINN. CRIMINAL CODE § 609.395 (1962). [Herein-
after references to the Proposed Minn. Criminal Code will be made only
by section numbers.]
11. 257 Minn. 46, 99 N.W.2d 902 (1959).
12. Id. at 52, 99 N.W.2d at 907.
13. E.g., § 609.535, dealing with the issuance of a worthless check, pro-
vides: "Any of the following is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding
that the person "at the time he issued the check or other order for the
payment of money, intended it should not be paid."
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prescribing the conditions and limitations under which certain ac-
tivities may be conducted. Usually such measures relate to a pro-
duction or distribution of goods, foods, drinks, drugs, intoxicat-
ing liquors, and the like. Violation of these provisions is made
a crime, usually a misdemeanor. These regulatory measures gen-
erally do not appear in the present criminal code.14 In a few in-
stances, repeal was recommended rather than transfer to another
chapter.' 5 The opposite policy-bringing the regulatory pro-
visions outside the criminal code into the criminal code because
criminal consequences are imposed-was considered by the Ad-
visory Committee in the early stages of its deliberation, but it was
concluded that this alternative was impossible. It would mean, for
example, transfer of whole chapters (such as the traffic code) in-
to the criminal code, most of which deal only incidentally with
the criminal aspects of the subject.
The Advisory Committee also recommended that a group of es-
sentially procedural statutes be transferred to other chapters. The
Committee felt that consideration of these provisions should be
14. Examples are MINN. STAT. §§ 616.17 (conditions requiring dead do-
mestic animal disposals), .35 (prescribing the amount of gold or silver on
gold plated or silver plated items made for sale), .55 (punishing
the use of false weights or measures of any commodity or article of mer-
chandise for the purpose of injuring or defrauding another). MINN. STAT.
§§ 618.01-.25 (1961), the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, falls within this
category, for the principal purpose of the act is to provide the conditions
and regulations that will assure that narcotics are distributed only to those
legally authorized to receive them.
15. An example is MINN. STAT. § 616.05 (1961):
Every person who, with intent that the same may be sold as unadulter-
ated or undiluted, shall adulterate or dilute wine, milk, distilled spirits,
or malt liquors, or any drug, medicine, food, or drink for man or
beast; or shall offer for sale or sell the same as unadulterated or
undiluted, or without disclosing to or informing the purchaser that the
same has been adulterated or diluted; or shall manufacture, sell, ex-
pose, or offer for sale, as such article of food or drink, any sub-
stance in imitation thereof, without disclosing the imitation by a suit-
able and plainly visible mark or brand; or with intent that the same
may be used as food, drink, or medicine, shall sell, offer or expose
for sale, any article whatsoever which to his knowledge has become
spoiled, tainted, or for any cause unfit to be used as food, drink, or
medicine, where special provision has not otherwise been made by
statute for its punishment shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and pun-
ished by a fine of not less than $25.00, or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not less than 30 days.
This sweeping statute goes back to territorial days and has been amended
from time to time. At the present time, however, it is almost completely
superseded by provisions appearing in regulatory chapters outside the crim-
inal code and appears to be little used, if at all. For references to the
several statutes now dealing with the subject matter of MINN. STAT.§ 616.05 (1961), see PROPOSED MINN. CRIMINAL CODE, app. C, at 244. For
references to MINN. STAT. §§ 616.18-.19 (1961), see id. at 245.
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deferred until the whole subject of procedure is considered by an
appropriate study conducted with a view to revision of this topic. A
major exception to this policy was those provisions dealing with sen-
tencing. Sentencing was considered so vital a part of the administra-
tion of criminal justice and so badly in need of revision in Minne-
sota that it was included as part of the proposed criminal code.
In any case, the provisions on sentencing, while not defining
substantive crimes, are probably not procedural to such a degree
that they would be the proper subject matter of rule making by
court, which the Advisory Committee assumed will ultimately be
adopted in this state.
Another basic policy of the Committee was to state the crimes
retained from the present code in clear, specific, and simple lan-
guage, avoiding overlapping and duplication. Several methods were
employed to achieve this objective. Instead of designating each
crime as a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony, the speci-
fic sentence attached to the crime is stated in the section defin-
ing the crime itself. In this respect the Wisconsin act was follow-
ed rather than the example of the American Law Institute Model
Penal Code. The Model Code undertakes to place all crimes
into a few categories or degrees defined by general definitions;
sections dealing with a specific crime then designate the classifi-
cation into which the crime is placed. Thus, a reader of a given
section dealing with a specific crime, if he is not familiar with
the classification, must refer back to the classification to ascer-
tain what the penalty for the crime is. The method adopted in
the proposed code has the further merit of compelling considera-
tion of the gravity of each crime and its appropriate sentence with-
out reference to any general classification.
Except in the case of homicide, breaking up specific crimes in-
to degrees has been largely eliminated, again following the Wis-
consin example. In some instances, like rape, assault, arson, and
forgery, the crime is divided into aggravated and simple forms.
At other times, different sentences are specified for different kinds
of violations of the section without attempting a characteriza-
tion. 6 Simplification was further secured by placing related pro-
visions now appearing in independent sections as clauses or sub-
divisions in a single section. This rearrangement was particularly
successful in achieving condensation and simplification in cases of
theft, forgery, and criminal damage to property.
16. See, e.g., §§ 609.225 (aggravated assault), .335 (prostitution), .60(dangerous trespasses and other acts). Different sentences for theft are
based primarily on the value of the property taken. See text accompany-
ing notes 81-86 infra.
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To avoid present confusion, an attempt was also made to
state more clearly than do present statutes the particular criminal
intent or purpose required for each particular crime. Terms in the
present statutes such as "willful," "maliciously," "knowingly," and
"wantonly" have produced much confusion and uncertainty as to
what mental state is intended. Throughout the proposed criminal
code, the word "intentionally" or "with intent to" has been used.
Section 609.02(9) defines these terms. For example, clause (3)
of that subdivision provides:
"Intentionally" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified or believes that this act, if suc-
cessful, will cause that result. In addition, except as provided in clause
(6),17 the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are neces-
sary to make his conduct criminal and which are set forth after the
word "intentionally."
All sections of the proposed code in which these terms are used
must therefore be read in connection with the definitions.
Also, the proposed code states the several crimes in terms of
the general acts sought to be prohibited and avoids enumeration
of specific instances that exemplify the general act. In addition,
it was deemed unnecessary surplusage to state that an act should
not be done "directly or indirectly" or that the defendant should
not "cause or procure it to be done." To prohibit the act is all
that is needed."
An illustration of what can be achieved by these methods is
illustrated by the proposed code's treatment of the substance
of section 621.341 of the Minnesota Statutes, which reads:
Any person who shall operate or cause to be operated or who shall
attempt to operate or attempt to cause to be operated any automatic
vending machine, coin-box telephone or other receptacle designed to
receive lawful coin of the United States of America in connection
with the sale, use or enjoyment of property or service, by means
of a slug or of any false, counterfeited, mutilated or sweated coin,
or by any means, method, trick or device whatsoever not lawfully
authorized by the owner, lessee or licensee of such machine, coin-
box telephone or receptacle; or who shall take, obtain or receive from
or in connection with any automatic vending machine, coin-box tele-
phone or other receptacle designed to receive lawful coin of the
17. Clause (6) eliminates knowledge of the age of a minor even though
age is a material element in the crime in question. This is particularly
applicable to §§ 609.31 (sexual intercourse with a female child), .335 (pros-
titution), .30(4) (sodomy and other like crimes).
18. An exception to this statement appears in the section on bribery. It
adds to the meaning of the crime that one is guilty if he "offers, gives,
or promises to give, directly or indirectly . . . any benefit, reward or con-
sideration . . . ." § 609.42(1). (Emphasis added.)
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United States of America in connection with the sale, use or enjoy-
ment of property or service, any goods, wares, merchandise, gas, elec-
tric current, article of value, or the use or enjoyment of any tele-
phone or telegraph facilities or service, or of any musical instrument,
phonograph or other property, without depositing in and surrendering
to such machine, coin-box telephone or receptacle, lawful coin to the
amount required therefore by the owner, lessee or licensee of such
machine, coin-box telephone or receptacle, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
The substance of this provision is covered in the theft section of
the proposed code, which provides that anyone commits theft who:
Intentionally obtains property or services, offered upon the deposit
of a sum of money or tokens in a coin or token operated machine
or other receptacle, without making the required deposit or other-
wise obtaining the consent of the owner.19
Finally, the methods described required in some instances a nar-
rowing of the scope of the crime as it is now defined. A striking
example is section 621.13 of the Minnesota Statutes, which
reads:
Every person who shall make or mend, or cause to be made or
mended, or have in his possession, in the day or night-time; any en-
gine, machine, tool, false key, picklock, bit, nippers, implement, or
explosive adapted, designed, or commonly used for the commission of
burglary, larceny, or other crime, under circumstances evincing an in-
tent to use or employ, or allow the same to be used or employed,
in the commission of a crime, or knowing that the same is intended
to be so used, shall be guilty of a felony. The having in possession
any such engine, machine, tool, false key, picklock, bit, nippers, im-
plement, or explosive shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
so use or employ the same in the commission of a crime.
Note that the words "or other crime" encompass misdemeanors
as well as felonies. Hence, the mere possession of an "implement"
or tool for the purpose of committing a misdemeanor becomes a
felony with a possible sentence of seven years imprisonment. The
section appears to mean that anyone who carries a gambling de-
vice, including probably a deck of cards, with intent to engage in
gambling, or who has in his possession fishing tackle or a gun in-
tending to fish or hunt out of season or catch or shoot protect-
ed fish or game, or who has a firecracker intending to explode
it on the Fourth of July, or who carries a contraceptive with for-
nication in mind, is a felon subject to the penalty indicated since
these are "tools" or "implements" "adapted" or "commonly used
for the commission of" these crimes. Such a statute ought not to
19. § 609.52(2) (7). Clause (7) quoted in the text also covers the sub-
stance of MINN. STAT. § 621.342 (1961).
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exist. The corresponding section in the proposed code is con-
fined to the possession of any device, explosive, or other instru-
mentality with intent to use or permit the use of the same to com-
mit burglary.2"
These several devices resorted to by the Committee led to a
very substantial reduction in the total number of sections, although
much of the present law appearing in independent sections ap-
pears in the proposed revision as subdivisions or clauses of single
sections. About 85 sections are recommended for repeal and about
185 for transfer to other chapters.
The Advisory Committee was faced at the outset with the ques-
tion of whether it should undertake merely to restate the law as
it presently exists or to recommend improvements in its substance
as well. The original 1955 act creating the Commission directed
the recommendation of improvements. Merely to restate the pres-
ent law without change would meet neither the needs of the state
nor the intent of the legislature. The ten year study devoted to
the preparation of the Model Penal Code by the American Law
Institute indicates recognition of the need for improvement in the
criminal codes of this country by a national organization of judges
and lawyers. The illustrations already given sufficiently show that
this need exists in Minnesota. The legislation creating the Com-
mission was enacted shortly after Wisconsin made many changes
in and greatly modernized its criminal law, and it is fair to as-
sume that the Minnesota legislature had a similar objective in mind.
A similar position was taken in the preparation of the Illinois
Revised Criminal Code, adopted in 1961.
The proposed code, therefore, contains many modifications in
existing law that the Committee felt were required to incorporate
the product of experience, scholarship, and modern conceptions
of criminal behavior and its causes and control. But in so doing,
the Committee operated within the framework of the existing crim-
inal code. For the most part, it did not undertake to incorporate
new criminal offenses. Rather it restated existing crimes with such
changes and improvements as appeared justified in the light of
present day knowledge and principles.
It is not possible, of course, to include in this discussion all the
crimes covered by the proposed code. Four subjects have been
selected that should sufficiently illustrate the approach of the Com-
mittee and the character of the provisions of the code as a whole:
homicide, theft, sex offenses, and sentences.
20. § 609.59.
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H. HOMICIDE
A. MURDER IN THE FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE
Prior to 1959, murder in both the first and second degrees car-
ried mafdatory life imprisonment sentences. Murder in the first
degree consisted of a killing "perpetrated with a premeditated de-
sign to effect the death of the person killed or of another."'"
Murder in the second degree encompassed two different categor-
ies: (1) the killing of a human being with a design to effect the
death of the person killed or another, but without deliberation and
premeditation; and (2) a death arising out of the commission of or
attempt to commit designated sex offenses.? The existence of
these two degrees, both carrying identical mandatory life imprison-
ment sentences, made little sense and undoubtedly many juries
believed that they were exercising leniency on behalf of the de-
fendant in returning a verdict of murder in the second degree
rather than in the first degree.
This anomaly was partially eliminated in 1959. The punishment
for murder in the second degree was reduced to not less than 15
nor more than 40 years when there is a design to effect the death
of the person killed or another, but it is without deliberation and
premeditation. However, the punishment for death resulting from
the commission of or attempt to commit a sex offense was left as
it had been earlier-mandatory life imprisonment.2
The proposed revision undertakes to remove the anomaly in its
entirety. Death resulting from the commission of or attempt to com-
mit a sex offense is removed from the crime of murder in the
second degree and added as a second category to murder in the
first degree. In addition, the scope of sex offenses falling within
the provision is limited to that of rape or sodomy committed with
force or violence. Murder in the second degree is thus confined
to a killing with intent to effect death, but without premeditation.
In addition, the minimum 15 year imprisonment sentence has
been eliminated.24
The result of the 1959 legislation and the proposed revision is
that whether a defendant is subject to life imprisonment for mur-
der in the first degree or to a term not exceeding 40 years for
murder in the second degree turns on whether he had "deliberat-
ed" or "premeditated" as well as intended the murder. As inter-
21. See MINN. STAT. § 619.07 (1961).
22. Minn. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 314, § 1.
23. MINN. STAT. § 619.08 (1961).
24. See §§ 609.185, .19. Present law does not prevent the parole board
from granting parole at an earlier time. MINN. STAT. § 243.05 (1961).
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preted under the pre-1959 law, these terms had almost no mean-
ing. They meant only that an interval of time was needed suf-
ficient to form the intent.25 It was believed by the Advisory Com-
mittee that content should now be given to these terms. For this
purpose, only the term "premeditation" is used, and it is defined
as meaning "to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to
commit, the act referred to prior to its commission."26 It is hoped
that this definition will enable the courts to give some substance
and meaning to the distinction between first and second degree
murder, and that life imprisonment, when it depends upon this
distinction, will be reserved for those cases involving the murderer
who lies in wait for his victim, or plans, calculates, and prepares
to commit the fatal act.
The premise upon which the distinction is based may to some
extent be invalid. The person who ponders, hesitates, and doubts,
but under the stress of real or supposed circumstances, finally
determines to commit the fatal act is a less dangerous individual
and less to be condemned than one who without hesitation or in-
hibitions and without premeditation instantly but intentionally
kills his victim. Considerations of this kind were put aside in the
revision in favor of the traditional approach in view of the fact
that the subject had been given such recent consideration by the
legislature.
B. MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE
Murder in the third degree under the new revision covers the
same two categories as the present law." The first applies when
the defendant "perpetrates an act eminently dangerous to others
and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life."28 This
statutory language probably conveys to the jury as well as any ex-
pression can the state of mind that the jury is required to find for
conviction.29 The provision, however, has not been without criti-
25. The following instruction was sustained in State v. Prolow, 98 Minn.
459, 461, 108 N.W. 873, 874 (1906):
Premeditation may be formed at any time, moment, or instant be-
fore the killing. Premeditation means thought of beforehand for any
length of time, no matter how short. There need be no appreciable
space of time between the intention of killing and the act of killing.
They may be as instantaneous as the successive thoughts of the
mind.
26. § 609.18.
27. MINN. STAT. § 619.10 (1961).
28. § 609.195.
29. In State v. Stokely, 16 Minn. 282, 294 (1871), the defendant stabbed
the deceased with a knife with an underhand blow during an attack upon
the deceased. The court characterized this as "an act certainly eminently
[Vol. 47:417426
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cism as being misleading in what it appears to require.30
Note that the word "eminently" rather than the word "immi-
nently" is used. The two words, of course, have different meanings.
"Eminently" means clearly or obviously, while "imminently" re-
fers to the immediacy of the act referred to. "Imminently" ap-
peared in the 1881 revised Penal Code of New York from which
Minnesota's present criminal code was taken. The New York Pe-
nal Code in turn merely adopted language that had prevailed
since the 1829 Revised Statutes of New York in which the phrase
was first formulated. 31 Whether the change in Minnesota was by
design or through clerical error cannot be known. In any event, it
was believed that the word "eminently" stated more accurately
the intended meaning.
The second category of murder in the third degree under the
proposed revision covers cases where an unintended death is
caused in committing or attempting to commit "a felony upon or
affecting the person whose death was caused or another."3 The
only substantial change from present law made by this provision
consists in the deletion of the words "or otherwise" following the
word "another." The provision incorporates what is commonly re-
ferred to as the "felony-murder rule" which has been subject to
much criticism on the ground that it is highly punitive and ob-
jectionable as imposing the consequences of murder upon a
dangerous to life, and which could only be done by a person regardless, at
the time, of the life of the deceased . . . . [S]uch an act is certainly
evidence of the depraved mind contemplated in the statute . . . ." See also
State v. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N.W. 1094 (1896). Driving down a street
at a high rate of speed and in a drunken condition falls within the mean-
ing of the provision. State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W. 42 (1923).
State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 418, 214 N.W. 280, 281 (1927), states
that "there was evidence from which the jury could find that defendant
in a maudlin spirit of recklessness and wanton depravity swerved from
side to side of the street in an effort to throw Cittadino from the rumble
seat, looking back as he was zigzagging on at a furious speed, and in-
quring of his companions whether the 'dago' was still there."
30. The 1953 report of the Judiciary Committee of the Wisconsin Leg-
islative Council stated:
This language is misleading in several respects: (1) An 'act imminent-
ly dangerous to others' does not mean dangerous to a large number
of people; it is sufficient if it is dangerous only to the person who
is killed . . . . (2) 'Depraved mind regardless of human life' does
not mean what it seems to imply, i.e., that the actor has a mental
disorder. The mind does not in any sense have to be diseased ....
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1953 JUDICIARY CoIniFFrEE REPORT
ON THE CRIMINAL CODE 59. The Committee recommended a reworded ver-
sion of the requirement, but this was rejected and the criticized language
restored. Wis. STAT. § 940.02 (1959).
31. See 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 4, ch. I, tit. I, § 5 (1829).
32. § 609.195. Sex crimes resulting in death and covered by first degree
murder are excluded specifically by the section.
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death wholly unintended. It is particularly severe in its applica-
tion to cases where the death was caused by an accomplice."
Such criticism is particularly warranted when the unintended
death constitutes murder in the first degree and capital punish-
ment is imposed. Such is the law in New York." Wisconsin
limits liability to cases where the death is "a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit the fel-
ony" and adds 15 years imprisonment in excess of the maximum
provided by law for the felony. The law proposed in Minnesota
is similar. Death resulting from the commission of a property
crime is no longer felony-murder; the felony must be upon or
affect the person whose death was caused or another.3" Such a
felony inherently involves a risk of death. Sentence is limited to
25 years imprisonment. Under the proposed code, the defendant
could be sentenced only for the murder or the felony but not
both. 6 It is believed that with these limitations a substantial part
of the objections have been met.
The change making death resulting from specified sex felonies
first degree murder will affect the eligibility of those convicted of
such crimes to parole. Under section 243.05 of the Minnesota
Statutes, a convict serving a life sentence for first degree murder
is not eligible for parole until he has served 25 years, less al-
lowance for good conduct. Others serving life sentences for mur-
33. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958),
in which the court refused to apply the doctrine where the defendant's
accomplice had been killed by a policeman apprehending them. See also
People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960),
holding that the New York section limits liability to cases where the death
results from an act committed either by the defendant or his accomplice
in furtherance of the intended crime.
Minnesota cases are not of much assistance on this question. In State
v. McTague, 158 Minn. 516, 197 N.W. 962 (1924), the deceased was shot
and killed by the defendant. The court stated: "If the purpose of the men
in the bandit car was to wound only and to make their escape, that is,
to commit a felony, they were guilty of murder in the third degree under
the statute making an unintentional killing, which results while committing
a felony, murder in the third degree." Id. at 519, 197 N.W. at 963. In
State v. Jackson, 198 Minn. 111, 268 N.W. 924 (1936), the deceased was
killed by a blow on the head with a blunt instrument inflicted during a
robbery. The court could find no evidence of a design to kill in inflicting
the blow but held there was ample evidence to sustain a conviction of
murder in the third degree. Both cases are obvious instances for the ap-
plication of the felony-murder doctrine if it is to be applied at all.
34. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1044.
35. § 609.195(2).
36. § 609.035 provides that "if a person's conduct constitutes more than
one offense under the laws of this state he may be punished for only one
of such offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a
bar to prosecution for any other of them."
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der other than first degree are eligible for parole at the expira-
tion of 20 years, less good conduct allowance. The effect of the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee making sex felony-
murders first degree murder is therefore to increase the time re-
quired to be served on a life sentence in such cases from 20 years
to 25 years. This was not the desire of the Committee, but it was
felt that amendment of section 243.05 should be the subject of a
separate bill and should not be included in the recommended
substantive provisions.
C. MANSLAUGHTER
The changes made in the manslaughter provisions are some-
what more substantial. Those made with respect to manslaughter
in the first degree are sufficiently explained in the notes to the
proposed section and need not be repeated here.3
As proposed,"8 four classes of cases are covered by man-
slaughter in the second degree. In flhe first, death must result
from "culpable negligence whereby [the actor] creates an un-
reasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death
or great bodily harm to another." This undertakes to spell out
what is probably implicit in the present undefined term "culpable
negligence."39 More than ordinary negligence is required. The de-
fendant must create an unreasonable risk of causing death or great
bodily harm to another and he must be conscious that he is taking
that chance. This reflects the fact that throughout the proposed
criminal code, the Advisory Committee pursued the policy of lim-
iting crimes to cases where there is an element of conscious
guilt or consciousness of wrongdoing. With some exceptions, un-
less accompanied by some other element such as the commission
of a crime, it was the policy of the Committee not to impose crim-
inal liability on negligence not accompanied by some mental ele-
ment of the kind described.
One of those exceptions appears in the second class of cases
included within manslaughter in the second degree. It consists
of shooting another with a firearm or other dangerous weapon as
a result of negligently believing him to be a deer or other animal.
This incorporates present law under which it has been held that
ordinary negligence is sufficient to impose criminal liability.40
A third category of manslaughter in the second degree imposes
37. See § 609.20.
38. See § 609.205.
39. SeeMINN. STAT. § 619.18(3) (1961).
40. State v. Hayes, 244 Minn. 296, 70 N.W.2d 110 (1955). See MINN.
STAT. § 619.18(4) (1961).
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liability for "setting a spring gun, pit fall, deadfall, snare or other
like dangerous weapon or device .... "41 Here neither neg-
ligence nor intent to cause death is required. This clause essential-
ly applies the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine. Under the pro-
posed code, the setting of these devices is itself made a gross mis-
demeanor." In the proposed section defining manslaughter in the
first degree, the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine has been
limited to death resulting from "committing or attempting to com-
mit a crime with such force and violence that death of or great
bodily harm to any person was reasonably forseeable . .. .""
Setting these devices would not come within that provision, hence
the explicit provision was necessary.
The fourth category of manslaughter in the second degree deals
with "negligently or intentionally permitting any animal, known
by him to have vicious propensities, to go at large, or negligently
failing to keep it properly confined, and the victim is not at
fault."" Here, again, ordinary negligence would be sufficient to
impose liability; this is but a continuation of the present law.45
There has been some modification in the crime of criminal neg-
ligence resulting in death from the operation of a vehicle. The pro-
posed section covers not only automobiles but aircraft and water-
craft.4" The latter now appear in separate sections outside of
the criminal code."' These sections are identical in requiring that
the vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft be operated "in a reckless or
grossly negligent manner." The meaning to be ascribed to these
words has caused considerable difficulty. In State v. Bolsinger, the
Minnesota court undertook to clarify this phrase. It was of the
opinion that two types of conduct were referred to, one called
"reckless," and the other "grossly negligent."
The meaning of the word "reckless," so far as it relates to driving,
is found in § 169.13 . . . , which defines "reckless" driving as driv-
ing "in such a manner as to indicate either a wilful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of persons or property." That means conscious
and intentional driving which the driver knows, or should know, creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to others . . . .By this is not meant
that the driver must be personally conscious of his wrongdoing; it is
sufficient that he ought to realize the fact. 4s
41. § 609.205(3).
42. § 609.665.
43. § 609.20(2).
44. § 609.205(4).
45. MINN. STAT. § 619.21 (1961).
46. See § 609.21.
47. See MINN. STAT. §§ 169.11 (motor vehicles), 360.75 (aircraft),
361.06 (watercraft).
48. 221 Minn. 154, 157, 21 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1946). The court also
relied upon the definition of "reckless" in several Massachusetts cases.
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The court characterized gross negligence as "very great negligence
or absence of even slight care,149 which was more than ordinary
negligence, but less than reckless conduct. Gross negligence was al-
so considered to be different in meaning from culpable negli-
gence, the difference being that culpable negligence "involves the
idea of recklessness and [gross negligence] does not."' ' These
super-fine distinctions, which can at most be merely matters of
degree, must produce nightmares for trial judges in formulating
their instructions and headaches for juries in trying to understand
and apply them.
The problem is probably inherent in the effort to create a sep-
arate crime of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle
resulting in death, and in attempting to provide a standard dif-
ferent from that of culpable negligence required for manslaughter.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the Advisory Committee de-
cided merely to eliminate the requirement of "reckless" and to con-
fine criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle to cases
of "gross negligence," leaving further development of the law on
the subject to the courts. The omission of the word "reckless" will
cause little change in the law since any instance that would qualify
as "reckless" would also automatically qualify as "gross negli-
gence." The fact that the defendant was guilty of conduct more
severe than required for "gross negligence" would not exonerate
him."1
Section 619.18 of the Minnesota Statutes makes it manslaught-
er in the second degree to cause an unintentional death by "a
trespass, or other invasion of a private right" or "by any act ...
49. Id. at f59, 21 N.W.2d at 485.
50. Id. at 163, 21 N.W.2d at 487.
51. Wisconsin uses the term "high degree of negligence" in defining this
offense and defines it as "conduct which demonstrates ordinary negligence
to a high degree, consisting of an act which the person should realize
creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability of death or
great bodily harm to another." This would appear to fall within the category
of the term "reckless" as defined in the Bolsinger case. See Wis. STAT.§ 940.08 (1961).
The revision in Illinois requires that the defendant's acts "are such as
are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he
performs them recklessly." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1961). "Reck-
lessly" is defined as follows: "A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circum-
stances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining
the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the stand-
ard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-6. This again requires a higher degree of neg-
ligence than under the Bolsinger case and requires substantially the same
conduct as the proposed Minnesota Criminal Code does for manslaughter
in the second degree. See § 609.205.
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of any person" not constituting some other degree of homicide.
Literally applied, these sweeping provisions would impose absolute
liability for any unintentional death caused by any tort without re-
gard to fault." These provisions have not been given substantial
consideration by the Minnesota Supreme Court, probably because
prosecuting authorities have not undertaken to base prosecutions
on them. They have been deleted in the proposed revision.
III. THEFT
A. AT COMMON LAW
At common law, the misappropriation of the property of another
was covered by three different offenses. The earliest in point of
history was larceny, which developed from the concept that the
wrong consisted of taking and carrying away property from the
possession of another without his consent and with intent to de-
prive him permanently of it. The wrongful act stressed was that
of taking property from the possession of another. This, of course,
did not include cases where the defendant had been entrusted with
the property by the owner and had subsequently made off with it.
The developing economy and the growth of fiduciary relationships
in England made necessary legislation to cover these situations.
Hence, the crime of embezzlement by designated fiduciaries, such
as clerks, attorneys, and brokers, was created by legislation. Sim-
ilar statutes have been almost universally enacted in this country.
Similarly, the common-law crime of larceny did not cover cases
where the defendant had obtained money or property of another
by means of false representations that induced the owner to give
up the property. In response to this need, legislation was enacted
creating the crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses. 53 The
52. In State v. Pankratz, 238 Minn. 517, 537, 57 N.W.2d 635, 647
(1953), the following trial court definition of "trespass or other invasion of
private right" was sustained:
The term 'trespass or other invasion of a private right, not amount-
ing to a crime' in the foregoing definition means some physical act
against the person killed in the nature of a transgression of a duty
owed to others, involving some violence, however slight, such violence
being no more than the breaking of a blade of grass. A private right
means some power or privilege to which one is entitled upon prin-
ciples of morality, religion, law or the like. It means a natural right
peculiar to an individual, one's own right.
The facts in the case, however, indicated a violent assault by the defendant
upon the deceased female and could be clearly sustained as a misdemeanor-
manslaughter case involving force and violence. There was no discussion of
the point by the court.
53. Later common-law courts extended larceny to cases where the posses-
sion of goods had been obtained by a misrepresentation and was known as
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essence of each of the offenses described was the appropriation of
the property of another to one's own use and, except for historical
reasons, a single crime based on this premise could have been creat-
ed.
B. MODERN TREATMENT
Modem statutes undertake to amalgamate these offenses. Section
622.01 of the Minnesota Statutes represents such an attempt. The
first two subdivisions provide that any person is guilty of larceny
who, with intent to deprive the owner of his property:
(1) Shall take from the possession of the true owner, or of any other
person, or obtain from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent
or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing,
or secrete, withhold, or appropriate to his own use, or that of any
person other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing
in action, evidence of debt, or contract, or article of value of any
kind;
(2) Having in his possession, custody, or control as a baile, servant,
attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association,
or corporation, or as a public officer, or person authorized by agree-
ment or by competent authority to hold or take such possession, cus-
tody, or control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract,
article of value of any nature, or thing in action or possession, shall ap-
propriate the same to his own use, or that of any other person than
the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof. . ..5
The poor draftsmanship of the section is evident. For example,
"appropriate to his own use, or that of any person other than the
true owner . . ." in the first subdivision includes within its
compass most of what is provided in the balance of the two sub-
divisions. Though probably not intended, the provisions appear to
extend to temporary use of property where there is no intent to
appropriate the property; an act that is generally not treated as
larceny. Thus, the section reads in part that one who "with intent
to deprive . . . the true owner . . .of the use and benefit there-
larceny by trick. Obtaining property by false pretenses was distinguished
on the basis that for this crime, title to the goods must pass to the de-
fendant or, and this was not clear, that title was intended to pass. Larceny
by trick applied if only possession was transferred or intended to be trans-
ferred.
No attempt is made here to state the exceptions and qualifications de-
veloped to the principles described in the text. For a short history of the
subject, see HALL, TBEFT, LAw AND SOCIETY 34-79 (2d ed. 1952).
54. Paragraph (3) of this section seems pure duplication of paragraphs
(1) and (2) reproduced in the text. It applies to "storage, forwarding, or
commission merchant, carrier, warehouseman, factor, or broker, or as a
clerk, agent, or employee" of these persons, and the acts prohibited clearly
fall within the prohibitions of the first two paragraphs.
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of . .. shall . . .withhold . . . any money . . ." is guilty
of larceny. Whatever its meaning, the section manifests an intent
to combine under the single label of larceny the former crimes of
larceny, obtaining goods by false pretenses, and embezzlement, the
last appearing in subdivision two of the section. The policy has
been defeated to a considerable degree by the requirement that
the information or indictment state one or the other of these crimes
and that under a charge of one the others cannot be proved.6
The proposed revision undertakes to effectuate the same policy
but with comparatively simple provisions. It provides:
Whoever does any of the following commits theft... :
(1) Intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers,
conceals or retains possession of moveable property of another with-
out his consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of
possession of the property ....
(3) Obtains for himself or another the possession, custody, or title
to property of a third person by intentionally deceiving him with a
false representation which is known to be false, made with intent to
defraud, and which does defraud the person to whom it is made
56
The word "takes" includes all that was recognized as larceny at
common law. This was the construction of the word under the
present section.57 The words "uses, transfers, conceals or retains"
include what was formerly designated "embezzlement," but it will
no longer be necessary to allege or prove any fiduciary relation-
ship.
55. State v. Henn, 39 Minn. 464, 465-66, 40 N.W. 564, 565 (1888):
[B]ecause the Penal Code has swept away the distinction between lar-
ceny at common law and obtaining property by false pretenses or
embezzlement, and made them all larceny, it does not follow that
the common form of an indictment for larceny would answer in all
cases. Under the Code there are several distinct acts or ways by which
a person may commit or be guilty of larceny; and in accordance
with the spirit, at least, of the bill of rights, which entitles the ac-
cused 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation'
against him, and the statute prescribing the rule by which the suf-
ficiency of indictments shall be determined, viz., that the act or omis-
sion charged as the offense shall be clearly and distinctly set forth,
we think that the indictment should charge the act constituting the
alleged larceny so as to advise the accused in which one of these
different ways he is charged with having committed the crime.
See also State v. Friend, 47 Minn. 449, 50 N.W. 692 (1891), in which it
was held that, under the charge that goods were "taken," the crime of
obtaining goods by false pretenses cannot be established. This, however,
is a procedural problem falling outside the compass of this discussion,
56. § 609.52(2).
57.
The word "take" has a definite and well-understood signification
in connection with the offense of larceny, and implies a trespass;
[Vol. 47:417434
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The third paragraph covers, of course, what has been known as
obtaining goods by false pretenses. It further specifies three kinds
of acts that constitute false representation within the meaning of
the paragraph.5" Two of these state existing law: the issuance
of a check, draft, or order for the payment of money or the de-
livery of property knowing that the actor has no authority to do
so,59 and secondly, unauthorized use of a credit card, credit plate,
and the like.60 The third kind of act specified by paragraph
three clarifies a point which presently is in doubt in Minnesota-
that a promise made with intent not to perform qualifies as a mis-
representation for the purposes of the section. Prevailing judicial
doctrine is to the contrary.6' But there are a growing number of
cases adopting the position stated in the revision as representing
the policy better designed to protect against fraudulent behavior
of this kind.62 Any fears that persons who promise in good faith
and the averment, "did wrongfully and feloniously take, steal, and
carry away," involves the possession, and the wrongful taking, of the
property from the actual or constructive possession of the owner, gen-
eral or special, and without his consent.
State v. Friend, 47 Minn. 449, 450, 50 N.W. 692, 693 (1891); see 2 BISHOP,
CRUMNAL LAW §§ 823-39 (6th ed. 1877).
58. They are:
(a) The issuance of a check, draft, or order for the payment of
money or the delivery of property knowing that he is not entitled
to draw upon the drawee therefor or to order the payment or de-
livery thereof; or
(b) A promise made with intent not to perform. Failure to per-
form is not evidence of intent not to perform unless corroborated
by other substantial evidence; or
() The unauthorized use of a credit card, credit plate, charge
plate, or other identification device issued by an organization to a
person for use in purchasing goods on credit ....
§ 609.52(2)(3).
59. See MINN. STAT. § 622.03 (1961).
60. See MINN. STAT. § 622.28 (1961).
61. Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Note also
the following statement appearing in State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 325, 326,
45 N.W. 614, 615 (1890):
The mortgaged premises were positively represented to be of great
value and double the amount of the note, and the note to be a
valuable security, worth its face value, when known to be worthless,
and these representations were coupled with a promise to find a pur-
chaser, which doubtless aided the consummation of the fraud, as it
was well calculated to do. Where a promise is thus connected with
false pretenses, and cooperates with them in the inducement, the case
is within the statute if the pretense of false existing or past facts is
sufficient. The promise and the pretense may be so connected that
it would be difficult to prove one without the other, and equally
necessary to an -intelligent statement of the facts that both be in-
cluded in the indictment.
62. See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (dis-
senting "opinion); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-4, 16-1 (1961); Pearce,
Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (1953).
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and later are unable to perform will be convicted as a result of
inferring from their failure to perform the existence of a prior
wrongful intent should be dissipated by the explicit requirement
that this is not evidence of such intent "unless corroborated by
other substantial evidence."
C. SWINDLING
Notwithstanding its uncertain character, the crime of swindling
has been retained, with modifications in wording,6 4 because it ap-
pears to be serving a useful function. References to "three-card
monte," "sleight of hand," or "use of cards or instruments of like
character" have been deleted as unnecessary.65 Courts have had
difficulty in formulating the crime's precise meaning, for it is basic-
ally only a specific instance of the crime of obtaining property
by false pretenses.66 Probably the offense can best be described
63. § 609.52(2) (3) (b). A similar provision appears in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 15-4(e) (1961). WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(d) (1961), requires that
the promise be "a part of a false and fraudulent scheme," a limitation
believed by the author to be too restrictive. It had not been recommended
by the Wisconsin Committee. 5 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1953 Ju-
DICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE 112.
64. § 609.52(2)(4).
65. See MINN. STAT. § 614.11 (1961) for the present provisions contain-
ing these terms.
66. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held the following transactions
to be swindling within the meaning of the statute: inducing the loan of
money for a bet with a purported stranger, actually a confederate of the
defendant, that the stranger could not open a trick lock, State v. Wilson,
72 Minn. 522, 75 N.W. 715 (1898); giving a $20 bill to a ticket seller,
pretending it was a $1 bill, and securing from the confused ticket seller
both the $20 and the change given in return, State v. Smith, 82 Minn.
342, 85 N.W. 12 (1901); inducing investments in a business by misrepresen-
tations as to the glowing prospects of the business, State v. Yurkiewicz,
208 Minn. 71, 292 N.W. 782 (1940); securing the cashing of a check by
ordering paint to be delivered at a fictitious address, State v. Cunningham,
257 Minn. 31, 99 N.W.2d 908 (1959). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
said, however, that giving a check without having funds in the bank to
meet it is not swindling, notwithstanding that defendant was engaged in
this activity on a fairly large scale. State v. Cunningham, 257 Minn. 31,
99 N.W.2d 908 (1959).
State v. Hale, 134 Mont. 131, 137-38, 328 P.2d 930, 934 (1958), con-
tains a good description of swindling:
The confidence games . .. are those whereby an elaborate scheme
is developed to play upon the credibility or sympathy or some other
trait of the victim. These confidence games ... often require de-
tailed and complex plots and time to support and mature their
elaborate scheme . . . .Those games .. . do not depend upon the
active or passive emotions of the victim. Such games are those pur-
ported gambling devices so contrived, although masked as legitimate
operations, to bilk the victim of his wager by manipulation. The two-
card faro-box, brace roulette-wheel and loaded dice are mechanically
fixed games in which it is so arranged by the mechanism that you never
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as one involving the obtaining of the victim's property by those
deceptive means that entail the use of rather elaborate schemes
or skillful manipulation to bring about the successful deception.
It is the use of elaborate schemes and skillful manipulation that
distinguishes it from obtaining goods by false pretenses.
The statement in the Minnesota cases that the crime is an at-
tempt to expand upon the common-law crime of cheats' is with-
out historical foundation. At the time the crime of swindling was
first enacted,6" the crime of cheats was already recognized by oth-
er sections of the statutes.69 If the swindling statute was intend-
ed to expand the crime of cheats, it would have been addressed to
the existing sections. It is also believed unwise to resurrect a long
forgotten, ancient common-law crime and to undertake to construct
the crime of swindling on that basis. It may be observed that the
crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses was originally created
partly to overcome the common-law requirement for the crime of
cheating-that ordinary prudence could not guard against the
taking. ° It would be unfortunate if this requirement should now
be revived in applying the swindling statute. Gullible people need
give the victim any break. Of the same ilk are the old shell game,
three-card monte or other sleight of hand or manipulated games
which effect the same result, all accompanied by fast work, fast
count and, buncombe talk by the operator.
67. See State v. Cunningham, 257 Minn. 31, 99 N.W.2d 908 (1959).
The statement was first made by Justice Mitchell in State v. Wilson, 72
Minn. 522, 75 N.W. 715, (1898), and has been repeated in subsequent
cases without further examination.
68. Minn. Sess. Laws 1877, ch. 130, § 1.
69. "Whoever is convicted of any gross fraud or cheat at common law
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than four
years, nor less than one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars, nor less than fifty dollars." Minn. Gen. Stat., ch. 95, § 45 (1878)(Young, 4th ed. 1883). Section 44 of the same chapter also provides that
"Whoever, designedly, by any false pretence, or by any privy or false token,
and with intent to defraud, obtains from any other person any money or
goods" was subject to the punishment stated. The words emphasized were the
basic requirement of common-law cheat.
70. Compare the following appearing in State v. Cunningham, 257 Minn.
31, 37-38, 99 N.W.2d 908, 912-13 (1959):
At common law cheating consisted of (1) the fraudulent taking of
another's property, (2) by means of a false token, symbol, or de-
vice, (3) of such a nature that common prudence could not guard
against it. The primary concern of the decisions interpreting § 614.11
has been the effect of the statute in modifying the second element
of the common-law offense. . . . [W]hile eliminating the common-
law requirement of a false token or symbol, this court has never in-
dicated that § 614.11 was intended to do anything other than codify the
third element of the common-law offense; namely, that the trick
must be of such a nature that ordinary prudence cannot guard against
it.
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as much, if not more, protection against swindlers than do others
endowed with greater caution.
Under the proposed revision, swindling becomes a form of theft,
subject to sentences that depend in considerable part on the amount
received.71 Under the present section, imprisonment up to five
years or a fine up to 2,000 dollars may be imposed without re-
gard to the amount received.72
D. PROPERTY TAKEN FOR TEMPORARY USE
Special problems are presented in cases where the defendant
has taken property of another for temporary use only, intending
that the property shall later be restored to the owner. An essen-
tial element of common-law larceny was intent to deprive the own-
er permanently of his goods. But confusion is added by section
622.17 of the Minnesota Statutes which states:
[T]he fact that the defendant intended to restore the property stolen
shall be no ground of defense, nor shall it be received in mitigation
of punishment unless the property shall have been restored before
complaint charging the commission of the crime has been made to a
magistrate.
The courts have not given this statute its apparent meaning; it
means only that once the theft is complete, having been committed
with intent to deprive the owner permanently of the goods, a
change of heart and a determination to restore the goods to the
owner does not constitute a defense to the prior crime.7"
It may be that the provision was directed principally at em-
bezzlement cases where an employee or other fiduciary appropri-
ates money of his employer or ward intending to return an equiv-
alent amount at some later time. This is generally held not to be a
defense even without a statutory provision, for the courts take the
position that the defendant has substituted his own personal credit
in place of the money that he took and .his ability to return the
funds may or may not materialize; furthermore, the money that
he restores is not the money that he took.74
71. § 609.52(2)(3). CAL. PEN. CODE § 332 deals with the crime in this
same manner.
72. MINN. STAT. § 614.11 (1961).
73. In State v. Thornton, 174 Minn. 323, 329, 219 N.W. 176, 178
(1928), the court stated that the statute "declares that intent to restore
shall be no defense. This is in accord with the well-settled rule that in-
tent to restore the property or its actual restoration constitutes no de-
fense to the criminal prosecution." This is an ambiguous statement, but
the annotations referred to show that the court had in mind the principle
stated in the text. See also State v. Eggermont, 206 Minn. 274, 279,
288 N.W. 390, 392 (1939).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1(2)(c), comment (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953).
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The proposed revision undertakes to make explicit that an in-
tent to deprive the owner permanently of his goods is the ordinary
requirement of tlieft.7  A separate provision deals specifically with
acts falling within the theft section but accompanied with "intent
to exercise temporary control only . ." In the first of the situa-
tions covered, the defendant must exhibit an "indifference to the
rights of the owner or the restoration of the property to him."7
What constitutes such "indifference" is a matter of construction
and, in a sense, a question of degree. The revision contemplates
such acts as using or abusing the property in a manner that ex-
ppses it to risk of damage, or using it so that it is in fact damaged;
leaving the property at some location where it may or may not
be found, the defendant being unconcerned whether it is recovered
or not; leasing, renting, or borrowing the property for a period
and continuing to use it beyond the period, the defendant being
unconcerned with whether the owner desires either its return or
compensation for the added use. Such misuse of another's property
is believed to be sufficiently serious to entail the same conse-
quences as any other theft.
Two other instances of temporary control constituting theft un-
der the proposed revision are (1) attempting to subject the prop-
erty to an adverse claim by pledge, lien, and so forth, and (2)
conditioning the return of the property on payment of a reward
or other compensation.' There are no corresponding explicit pro-
visions in the present criminal code of Minnesota.
Taking a motor vehicle for temporary use without the permis-
sion of the owner has been the subject of special statutes known
as the "joy riding" statutes. The subject is currently covered in
Minnesota by statutes appearing in the traffic code and making
the crime a felony.'8 The crime is intended to meet the problem
of taking cars on the street, driving them about, and then leaving
them for the owner or the police to find. It is committed principal-
ly by young people who cannot afford to own a car. The principal
75. The phraie "with intent to deprive the owner permanently of posses-
sion of the property" appears in § 609.52(2) (1). See also § 609.52(2)(2),
which requires, an intent to defraud in obtaining the property by false
representation. Other clauses have similar phrases which contemplate
permanent deprivation of the property from the owner.
76. § 609.52(2)(5)(a).
77. § 609.52(2) (5) (a), (b). This section undoubtedly represents present
law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1(2)(c), comment (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953).
78. MNN. STAT. § 168.48 (1961) applies to taking and removal from a
"warehouse, garage, or building of any kind." Section 168.49 makes it an
offense to "drive, operate or use a motor vehicle 'without the permission
of the owner," making § 168.48 unnecessary.
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statute, however, is drawn in extremely broad terms.7" The crime
is committed when the defendant either "drives" or "operates" or
"uses" the car without the owner's permission. Under these pro-
visions, anyone renting a motor vehicle and continuing to use it
beyond the term of the rental agreement becomes a felon even
though he intends to return it and to pay for its use since he is
using it without the permission of the owner. An employee driv-
ing his employer's car or truck in the course of his employment
violates the statute by deviating from his assigned route to stop
at his home or visit a friend. Literally applied, it would include a
case where a thief lent a car to the defendant who drove the car
without knowledge of the theft.
These relatively innocuous acts, though properly a basis for civil
claims, do not exhibit a criminal disposition and should not be
made criminal offenses. The proposed revision limits this offense
to cases where the defendant "intentionally takes and drives a mo-
tor vehicle without the consent of the owner or his authorized
agent," and changes the permissible sentence from up to five
years imprisonment or a fine of up to 500 dollars to up to three
years imprisonment or a fine of up to 3,000 dollars, or both.8
Under this provision, it is not enough that the defendant drive,
operate, or use the car; he must also have taken it without the
permission of the owner. The word "intentionally" requires that
he know that he is taking it without the owner's permission."'
These limitations will avoid the absurd possibilities of the present
law.
E. SENTENCES FOR THEFT
The present statutes on larceny divide the crime into three de-
grees: first, second, and petty. The difference depends on a rather
complex variety of factors such as whether the taking was from
the person at night, or from a building, shop, or motor vehicle, or
whether the property taken was of more than a stated value. This
approach has been abandoned in the revision pursuant to the gen-
eral policy of eliminating degrees of crime. A single subdivision
of the theft section has been substituted stating the several per-
missible sentences, which depend largely on the value of the prop-
erty taken.8" In four instances, the sentence may be up to five
79. MINN. STAT. § 168.49 (1961).
80. § 609.55(2). The term "motor vehicle" is broadly defined to in-
clude "any self-propelled device for moving persons or property or pulling
implements from one place to another, whether such device is operated
on land, rails, water, or in the air." § 609.55 (1).
81. See § 609.02(9) (3), defining the term.
82. § 609.52(3).
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years imprisonment or a fine of not more than 5,000 dollars with-
out regard to value because the property taken is of a particular
kind, such as that taken from a corpse, grave, or coffin, or be-
cause it is a public record, consists of public funds, or is taken
from the scene of a disaster. Other factors that now control the
degree within which the larceny falls have been discarded. The
proposed code thus follows the Wisconsin example where a simi-
lar revision has operated successfully for many years." The wrong
with which the crime of theft is concerned is the wrongful appro-
priation of personal property. Therefore, the amount or value of
the property taken should be the controlling consideration. Where
and under what conditions it is taken should have only a limited
significance.
This change will require some modification of the form of the
verdict. Instead of finding the defendant guilty or not guilty of a
particular degree of larceny, the jury will find the defendant guilty
or not guilty of theft. For this purpose, they need not consider the
value or the nature of the property since the elements of the crime
do not involve this question. But if the verdict is guilty, the jury
must also find as a separate issue the value of the property or
its nature, if that is the material question in the particular case.
The instruction will define value as it is defined in the proposed
section. 4 If the verdict is guilty, a typical form wiU be in sub-
stance:
'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of theft and find the value
of the property taken by him to have been $ - .85
This finding of value must be by the jury under proper instruc-
tions; it cannot be made by the court. 6 The jury need not be
told, however, that the sentence may vary depending on the value
of the property taken. That is no more of their concern under
the proposed section than it is presently.87
IV. SEX OFFENSES
The sex crimes deal with some of the most personal and in-
83. Wis. STAT. § 943.20(3) (1959).
84. § 609.52(1) (3).
85. See McEntee v. State, 24 Wis. 43, 44 (1869), where a particular
verdict is set out and discussed.
86. Heyroth v. State, 275 Wis. 104, 109, 81 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1957), and
cases cited.
87. State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 79, 51 N.W.2d 680, 685 (1951):
"It is proper in a criminal case to admonish the jury that the punishment
is a subject with which they have nothing to do, that the responsibility of
punishment rests exclusively with the court."
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timate aspects of an individual's life. It might be expected there-
fore that the state, dedicated in a democracy to the freedom of the
individual and respect for his dignity and privacy, should in-
vade this field with the greatest caution and only to the extent
necessary to protect other individuals and the public. This
has not been the case. Our present statutes were enacted in the
19th century when the subject of sex was not considered fit for
public discussion and the provisions of the criminal law reflected
more of an emotional reaction to certain kinds of sexual behavior
than a considered judgment as to the harm they involved to others
or to the public. As one author has stated, since having a
desire for sexual expression is universal, it should not be a crime, 88
but its assertion in socially harmful ways should be prohibited. To
use an analogy, theft does not punish the desire to have property,
but only the socially harmful means of obtaining that property.
This approach is reflected in the proposed revision.
A. RAPE
The crime of rape has been divided into two categories, but the
content of the two reflects generally the present law. 9 The
distinction between the two proposed categories turns on
the presence or absence of consent. Aggravated rape is con-
fined to those cases where the act is perpetrated by force or threat
of force or where the victim is incapable of giving consent, as by
reason of mental illness or unconsciousness.9" A provision not in
the present law has been added extending this serious offense to
law enforcement officers and officers and employees of penal or
other public institutions who take advantage of persons in their
custody. A similar provision has been the law in New York since
18929" and is recommended by the American Law Institute.
The other category, designated as rape, applies to cases where
consent to the act was obtained through trickery or fraud or other-
wise misleading the victim, or where consent was obtained by the
use of drugs or intoxicants that caused her to give the con-
sent, but which were taken without her knowledge or consent.92
It was felt that in these cases the violation of the person of a
woman was not of the same magnitude as in the cases pro-
vided for under the heading "aggravated rape" and should not,
therefore, carry the same severity of sentence.
88. Sherwin, Sex Crime-A Failure of the Law, 12 BAR BULL. OF N.Y.
COUNTY 116 (1954).
89. See MINN. STAT. § 617.01 (1961).
90. § 609.29.
91. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2010(5).
92. § 609.295.
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B. DEVIATE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
Deviate sexual behavior is dealt with in the present code in two
sections. The present section on sodomy punishes three forms of
such behavior, one of which is more properly called bestiality.9
Other forms of deviate behavior must be brought under the sec-
tion on indecent assault,9" to which consent of the victim or the
fact that the victim is a public prostitute is a defense unless he or
she is a child under 16 years of age. The present section on sodomy
also makes no distinction between cases where consent is present
and those in- which it is absent. It even applies to acts between
consenting spouses.
In the proposed revision, a distinction is drawn between cases
where-consent is present and where it is absent, following the lines
drawn in the provisions on rape. Possible sentence is increased
from the present 20 year imprisonment provision to 30 years in
those cases where force or threat of force is used or the victim
was unconscious or otherwise incapable of giving consent at the
time. of. the act.95- The possible sentence for acts to which there
is consent, but in. which the consent was obtained by trickery or
fraud or by the ise of a drug or intoxicant, is reduced from 20
to 10 years.9" When committed by adults who freely consent, the
crime is reduced to a gross misdemeanor.9 7
C-" OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN
Sexual relations, normal and abnormal, with children are pres-
ently covered. by several sections in the criminal code. Sexual rela-
tions with a female child in a normal manner fall within the car-
nal knowledge statute s and the severity of punishment, up to
life imprisonment, depends upon the age of the child. Sodomous
relations with a female child fall within this section also, by ju-
dicial construction. 99 Sodomous relations with a male child are
93. MINN. STAT. § 617.14 (1961).
94. MINN. STAT. § 617.08 (1961).
95. § 609.30(2).
96. § 609.30(3).
97. § 609.30(5). In this respect, the example of N.Y. PEN. LAw § 690,
making the offense a misdemeanor, and the recommendation of the Amer-
ican Law Institute to the same effect were not followed.
Bestiality is made a misdemeanor unless committed in the presence of
another, in which case it becomes a gross misdemeanor. "This, it is be-
lieved, meets more directly the purpose of the criminal law in penalizing
these reprehensible acts." § 609.305, comment.
98. MINN. STAT. § 617.02 (1961).
99. 'The use of the words carnally know in both the sodomy and carnal
knowledge statutes shows that the legislature regarded both crimes as in-
volving different kinds of carnal knowledge." State v. Schwartz, 215 Minn.
476, 478, 10 N.W.2d 370, 371 (1943).
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not included in the carnal knowledge section; hence its severe sen-
tences do not apply. Such cases must be brought either under the
sodomy section,' which carries a maximum sentence of 20
years regardless of whether a child is involved (compared with
life imprisonment under the carnal knowledge section if the child
is under ten years of age), or under the indecent assault sec-
tion,1 1 which carries a maximum sentence of only seven years
or a fine of 1,000 dollars, or both. The testimony of a'boy 16
years or more of age must be corroborated to secure conviction;
that of a girl under the age of 18 years need not be.'
In the proposed revision, there is an explicit provision creating
the crime of sodomy with a child, whether male or female.'03
Another provision covers normal sexual relations with a female
child.?° It modifies present law in two respects. Life imprison-
ment has been reduced to 30 years maximum imprisonment if
the child is under the age of ten years to eliminate the invitation
to murder otherwise existing. The offense has been reduced to a
gross misdemeanor in cases where the girl's age ranges- from 16
to 18 years and she is not a prostitute. This will meet the rather
widespread criticism of the harshness of the present law in this
type of case.
D. INDECENT LIBERTIES
Under present law, the taking of "indecent liberties" with anoth-
er without the victim's consent constitutes a felony.10 5 The term
"indecent liberties" is not defined, but undoubtedly contemplates
acts intended by the actor to arouse or gratify his own or the
victim's sexual desire. This can include relatively innocuous acts
as well as those of serious nature. The section draws no-distinc-
tion between cases where the "liberties" are taken with a child
100. MINN. STAT. § 617.14 (1961).
101. MINN. STAT. § 617.08 (1961) prohibits taking "any indecent liber-
ties with or on the person of any male under the age of 16 years, without
regard to whether he . . . shall consent to the same or not, or who shall
persuade or induce any male . . . under the age of 16 years to perform
any indecent act upon his . . . own body or the body of another."
102. State v. Schwartz, 215 Minn. 476, 10 N.W.2d 370 (1943), dis-
tinguishing State v. Penetti, 203 Minn. 150, 280 N.W. 181 (1938), on this
ground.
103. § 609.30(4). Sentences permitted range from a maximum of five
years, if the child is over the age of 14 years, to the maximum of 30
years, if the child is under the age of ten years. Life imprisonment, author-
ized under present statutes for the latter category, was believed to be un-
desirable as inviting murder of the child for which no greater penalty could
be imposed.
104. § 609.31.
105. MINN. STAT. § 617.08 (1961).
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and those directed at nonconsenting adults. It is a charge easily
made and open to abuse."0 6
In the *proposed revision, this offense has been divided into
three separate crimes. One deals with indecent liberties taken with
children under the age of 16 years.' If the child is under the
age of 14 years, imprisonment may be up to five years; if over
that age, the offense becomes a gross misdemeanor. It was believ-
ed that-younger children should be the subject of special solici-
tude in the creation of this crime. Indecent liberties with adults
is dealt with under the heading of "assault." It is a misdemean-
or 8 unless accompanied with force or threat of force, in which
case it becomes the gross misdemeanor of aggravated assault."°
.E. PROSTITUTION AND FORNICATION
While fornication is limited as an offense to cases where it is
done "'openly, '110 the recommendations on prostitution make the
proposed law more stringent, particularly as it applies to commer-
cialized ic'e, and special concern is shown for preventing children
from being brought into association with this evil." Under pres-
ent law, engaging in piostitution is only a misdemeanor-the
crime bf fornication.m " 2 Under the proposed revision, it will be-
come a gross misdemeanor." 3 The proposed revision clarifies
the'Minnesota law on the subject and brings within the compass
of a single section what now appears in duplicating, overlapping,
and in some measure, inconsistent provisions of the present code.
F. - ABORTION
Several changes are made in the crime of abortion. Under present
-law, it is sufficient to constitute the crime to "(1 ) prescribe, sup-
106. See State v. Rolfe, 151 Minn. 261, 186 N.W. 574 (1922).
107. § 609.315.
108. § 609.22(3).
109. § 609.225(3). If a dangerous weapon should be used or great
bodily harm inflicted. in committing the crime, it would become a more
seious violation of the aggravated assault section and sentences of five
or ten years imprisonment or fines of up to $5,000 or $10,000 respectively
or both are authorized.
110. § 609.32 will bring the state into line with the laws of most other
states which require that the act be done "openly and notoriously."MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). "Openly and
notoriously" is a more stringent requirement than the word "openly" alone.
It is common knowledge that the present law is widely disregarded with
prosecutions seldom resulting. Such flagrant disregard of one criminal law
creates disrespect for all laws.
111. § 609.335.
112. MINN. STAT. § 617.16 (1961).
113.-§ 609.335(4)(1). This follows ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-14
(1961) and WIS. STAT. § 944.30(1) (1959).
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ply, or administer to a woman, whether pregnant or not, or ad-
vise or cause her to take, any medicine, drug, or substance; or
(2) use, or cause to be used, any instrument or other means"
with the intention of producing a miscarriage."" Another sec-
tion punishes a pregnant woman who uses or submits to the use
of these means." 5 It is also an offense to "manufacture, give, or
sell any instrument, drug, or medicine, or any other substance,
with intent that the same may be unlawfully used in producing
the miscarriage of a woman.""' The punishment imposed for
the offense is greater than for the crime of abortion itself-sev-
en years imprisonment as opposed to four for abortion." 7 There
is also a prohibition against selling, advertising, or giving infor-
mation as to where means of committing an abortion can be ob-
tained, but this is only a gross misdemeanor." 8 The death of a
mother or an unborn quick child resulting from an illegal abortion
is manslaughter in the first degree." 9
The present crime of abortion is directed at the means that are
employed rather than at the destruction of the embryo or fetus
itself. Under the proposed section, the crime will consist of the
destruction of the embryo or fetus. " ' When means are employed
for this purpose, but no destruction results, the crime becomes an
attempt to commit an abortion. The distinction between a fetus
that has "quickened" and one that has not is retained, and a more
severe sentence is authorized for the former.' The sentences
for submitting to an abortion and for manufacturing and distribut-
ing means to commit an illegal abortion have been very sub-
stantially reduced. Prosecutions for the former are almost nonex-
istent for the simple reason that convictions against the woman
are almost impossible to obtain. The reduction for the latter of-
fense is in keeping with the general philosophy of criminal law
that acts anticipatory to an offense that may never materialize
should not carry a greater or even the same sentence as the of-
fense itself. 2
Another proposed change is in extending the instances in which
114. MINN. STAT. § 617.18 (1961).
115. MINN. STAT. § 617.19 (1961).
116. MINN. STAT. § 617.20 (1961).
117. MINN. STAT. § 617.20 (1961) simply makes the offense a felony
punishable by "imprisonment in the state prison or county jail for not more
than seven years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both."
MINN. STAT. § 610.16 (1961).
118. MINN. STAT. § 617.25 (1961).
119. MINN. STAT. § 619.16 (1961).
120. § 609.345.
121. § 609.345(2), (3).
122. See §§ 609.17 (attempts), .175 (conspiracy).
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an abortion is legally permitted. At the present time, legal abor-
tions are permitted only in cases where it is "necessary to preserve
her [the mother's] life, or that of the child with which she is
pregnant."' The statutes elsewhere in the United States are gen-
erally to the same effect. 4 Not many cases have construed the
phrase "preserve her life"; the tendency in the cases that deal with
the subject is to construe it in its broad sense. Imminent death
unless an abortion is performed is the obvious case, but the phrase
includes more than that and contemplates cases where permitting
the pregnancy to continue would lead to such mental or physical
deterioration or impairment that the life she is entitled to lead
would notbe preserved. It also encompasses cases where the moth-
er's life would be shortened.
The -leading case is Rex v. Bourne.' The facts stated in the
case incltided the following:
[Tihe girl, 'wh6 was then under the age of fifteen, had been raped
with great violence in circumstances which would have been most ter-
rifying to any woman, let alone a child of fourteen, by a man who
was in due course convicted of the crime. In consequence of the
rape the girl became pregnant. Her case was brought to the attention
of the defendant, who, after examination of the girl, performed the
operation with the consent of her parents.
* In his opinion the continuance of the pregnancy would probably
cause7 serious injury to the girl, injury so serious as to justify the re-
moval of the pregnancy at a time when the operation could be per-
formed without any risk to the girl and under favourable conditions.
The evidence of the defendant was supported and confirmed by
Lord Horder, and also by Dr. J. R. Rees, a specialist in medical
psychology. Dr. Rees expressed the view that, if the girl gave birth
123. MINN. STAT. § 617.18 (1961); accord, MINN. STAT. §§ 617.9,
619.19 (1961).
124. The state of the law is well summarized in Comment, 23 So. CAL.
L. REV. 523-24 (1950):
Only two statutes in the United States fail to indicate any exception
to the prohibitions [to abortion]. The others vary greatly but some
classification can be made. A great majority of statutes provide for
legality when necessary to preserve life; some seem to require an actual
necessity to save the life of the mother, or, upon medical advice, to
be necessary for that purpose. Others include preservation of the life
of the fetus, with similar variations as in the single exception with
regard to the mother's life. A good-faith attempt to preserve the life
of the mother or child is permitted in two statutes. Three statutes
prohibit only the 'unlawful' abortion, and one, if done, 'maliciously
and without justification.' More liberality is found in the wording of
four others. Two States allow an abortion when necessary 'to prevent
serious and permanent bodily injury' to the mother. The District of
Columbia allows it when necessary to preserve the 'health' of the
mother, and in Maryland, when necessary to preserve the 'safety' of
the mother. Only a few States limit the legal abortion to one per-
formed by a licensed physician or surgeon.
125. [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
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to a child, the consequence was likely to be that she would become
a mental wreck.
126
The trial judge in his instructions to the jury emphasized that this
was unlike the ordinary illegal abortion cases coming before the
court since the operation had been performed by a physician mo-
tivated by the highest professional motives. He referred to the pro-
vision in the English Statutes that excepted cases "done in good
faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the moth-
er' 1 27 and stated:
It is not contended that those words mean merely for the purpose
of saving the mother from instant death. There are cases, we are
told, where it is reasonably certain that a pregnant woman will not
be able to deliver the child which is in her womb and survive. In
such a case where the doctor anticipates, basing his opinion upon the
experience of the profession, that the child cannot be delivered with-
out the death of the mother, it is obvious that the sooner the opera-
tion is performed the better. The law does not require the doctor to
wait until the unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death.
In such a case he is not only entitled, but it is his duty to perform
the operation with a view to saving her life.
Here let me diverge for one moment to touch upon a matter that
has been mentioned to you, the various views which are held with
regard to this operation. Apparently there is a great difference of
opinion even in the medical profession itself. Some there may be, for
all I know, who hold the view that the fact that a woman desires the
operation to be performed is a sufficient justification for it. Well,
that is not the law: the desire of a woman to be relieved of her
pregnancy is no justification at all for performing the operation. On
the other hand there are people who, from what are said to be re-
ligious reasons, object to the operation being performed under any cir-
cumstances. That is not the law either. On the contrary, a person who
holds such an opinion ought not to be an obstetrical surgeon, for if
a case arose where the life of the woman could be saved by perform-
ing the operation and the doctor refused to perform it because of his
religious opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of
being brought before this Court on a charge of manslaughter by neg-
ligence .... 128
As I have said, I think those words ought to be constned in a
reasonable sense, and, if the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable
grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence
of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a
physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in that hon-
126. Id. at 688-89.
127. Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34.
128. The judge by this statement undoubtedly did not intend to imply
that a doctor would not be complying with his legal duty by recommend-
ing to his patient that the operation be performed by another physician
of equal competence willing to do so.
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est belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the
life of the mother.
These general considerations have to be applied to the particular
facts of this case; the verdict of the jury must depend on the facts
of the case proved before them. The girl in this case was under the
age of fifteen, for she has attained that age within the last ten
days. It is no doubt very undesirable that a young girl should be
delivered of a child. Parliament has recently raised the age of marriage
for a girl from twelve to sixteen, presumably on the view that a girl
under the age of sixteen ought not to marry and have a child. The
medical evidence given here confirms that view; the pelvic bones are
not set until a girl is eighteen, and it is an observation that appeals
to one's common sense that it must be injurious to a girl that she
should go through the state of pregnancy and finally of labour when
she is of tender years. Then, too, you must consider the evidence about
the effect of rape, especially on a child, as this girl was. Here you
have the evidence of Dr. Rees, a gentleman of eminence in the pro-
fession, that from his experience the mental effect produced by preg-
nancy brought about by the terrible rape which Dr. Gorsky describ-
ed to you, must be most prejudicial. You are the judges of the facts
and it is for you to say what weight should be given to the testimony
of the witnesses; but no doubt you will think it is only common sense
that a girl who for nine months has to carry in her body the reminder
of the dreadful scene and then go through the pangs of childbirth
must suffer great mental anguish, unless indeed she be feeble-minded
or belongs to the class described as "the prostitute class," a Dolores
"marked cross from the womb and perverse." You will remember
that the defendant said that if he had found that this girl was feeble-
minded or had what he called a "prostitute mind" he would not have
performed the operation, because in such a case the pregnancy would
not have affected her mind. But in the case of a normal, decent girl
brought up in a normal, decent way you may well think that Dr.
Rees was not overstating the effect of the continuance of the preg-
nancy when he said that it would be likely to make her a mental
wreck, with all the disastrous consequences that would follow from
that.L' 9
The defendant was acquitted by the jury.
A recent California case looks in the same direction. 30 In this
case, a prominent physician, charged with abortion, claimed he
had merely removed the remains of the placenta after a dead em-
bryo had been lost. The court held that the state had not establish-
ed beyond a reasonable doubt that this defense was false and not
made in good faith. The significance of the case lies in the com-
ments of the court.
Surely, the abortion statute ... does not mean .. . that the peril
to life be imminent. It ought to be enough that the dangerous con-
129. [1939] 1 K.B. at 692-95.
130. People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
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dition "be potentially present, even though its full development might
be delayed to a greater or less extent. Nor was it essential that the
doctor should believe that the death of the patient would be other-
wise certain in order to justify him in affording present relief.' ' 3'
In State v. Powers (1929), 155 Wash. 63, 67 [283 P. 439, 440] the
court satisfied itself with an interpretation of "necessity to save life"
by stating, "If the appellant in performing the operation did some-
thing which was recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled
in his profession practicing in the same community .. . then it can-
not be said that the operation was not necessary to preserve the
life of the patient."
It is evident that the condition which she had, could have develop-
ed to a fatal stage before Mrs. Gresham became fully aware of it,
or conversely, it might not have developed to the fatal stage. The
condition nevertheless would be deemed dangerous to life.
1 32
The only case dealing with the point in Minnesota lends support
to the position of the proposed code.13  Part of the trial court's
instruction read:
[W]hat is meant by that term ["preserve her life"] was the
immediate preservation of her life, not a future, indefinite danger
arising at some distant time through childbirth. The question is and
then was, not whether Louise Halvorson was in such a condition of
health when she called upon Doctor Hatch by reason of being
pregnant, that if permitted to go her full period, she would or might
die in giving birth to the child with which she was then pregnant,
and that, therefore, at the time of her call, it was necessary to produce
her miscarriage, but was it necessary to produce her miscarriage,
to perform the operation then and there and when he did, to im-
mediately preserve her life?
The comment of the Supreme Court was brief:
This charge, in the abstract, was not correct. The statute excepts from
its operation cases where a miscarriage is necessary to preserve life.
The statute does not say that in order to bring a case within the ex-
ception, the danger of death must be immediate, and it should not
be so construed. 34
131. Here the court cited State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221
N.W. 592 (1928); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E,2d
4 (1944); Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687; Comment, 23 So. CAL. L.
REV. 523 (1950).
132. 167 Cal. App. 2d at 814-16, 335 P.2d at 212-13. The case is
discussed in Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and
Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 123, 130 (1962).
133. State v. Hatch, 138 Minn. 317, 164 N.W. 1017 (1917).
134. Id. at 319, 164 N.W. at 1017. The court further stated:
It does not follow, however, that this language of the charge was
reversible error. We think it was not. The claim of the defense on
the trial was, not that the miscarriage was produced because of any
expected danger of death at childbirth, or at any remote time, but
because of a danger that was immediate: This theory of the case
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There are no other Minnesota cases on the question, and none
have been found elsewhere that state the law differently than de-
scribed above.
The proposed revision is not a very substantial extension of
present principles. It provides, under conditions that assure against
use in cases not intended," that a therapeutic abortion is justi-
fied if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) The pregnancy resulted from sexual intercourse in violation of
sections 609.29 [aggravated rape], 609.295 [rape], or 609.365 [in-
cest] and a complaint has been filed with the appropriate prosecut-
ing authorities charging such violation; or
(b) The abortion is necessary, and two additional licensed phy-
sicians so advise, to save the life of the mother, or to avoid grave
impairment of the physical or mental condition of the mother or to
prevent the birth of a child with grave physical or mental defect. 130
In view of the rather extensive public notice that these provi-
sions have received, some further amplification may be warranted
to explain the reasons of the Advisory Committee in recommend-
ing these provisions. They represent essentially the recommenda-
tions of the American Law Institute. These recommendations, to-
gether with extensive and complete documentation of existing law
here and elsewhere and of the facts and reasons for the recom-
mendations, were submitted to the Institute at its meeting in 1959.
Over 300 judges, lawyers, and law school professors and deans
from all parts of the country attended. The recommendations re-
ceived the overwhelming vote of the members of the Institute.
Among those attending were the leaders of the American bar,13 '
is manifest throughout the record. The evidence of defendant him-
self makes it clear that the danger to life, on which he relied, was
an immediate danger. This being the claim and theory of the de-
fense, an instruction that the danger must be immediate in order to
constitute a defense could not prejudice the defendant.
Id. at 319, 164 N.W. at 1017-18.
135. It must be performed by a licensed physician and, except in an
emergency, in a licensed hospital § 609.345(6)(1), (2).
136. § 609.345(6)(3).
137. Fifteen of them had been or later became president of the American
Bar Association, including the present incumbent; five, president of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; and four,
president of the American Judicature Society. Others present included the
late Judge Learned Hand; Honorable Charles E. Clark, former dean of
Yale Law School, former reporter to the Committee on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and Judge of the Court of Appeals of the Second Cir-
cuit; the late Honorable Herbert F. Goodrich, Judge of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals and Executive Director of the American Law Institute;
Honorable Harvey M. Johnson of the Eighth Circuit; Honorable Alfred P.
Murrah, Chief Judge, and Honorable Orrie L. Phillips from the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court; Honorable Albert B. Maris, now retired Judge of the Court
of Appeals of the Third Circuit and chairman of the Committee on Rules
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none of whom raised an objection to the adoption of the recom-
mendations submitted; the proceedings indicate that the vote in
support of them was overwhelming.
Nevertheless, the incorporation of these recommendations in
the Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code has re-
ceived criticism from those who consider them in conflict with the
teachings of their religion.13 The central thesis of this criticism
is that the embryo is a human being from the moment of con-
ception. From this position all else follows: it becomes murder de-
liberately to put an end to the embryo; the reasons stated in the
proposed section cannot justify it; human beings are not killed be-
cause they are the product of a rape or incest or because the
mother may be driven to insanity or reduced to physical incom-
petence. This view condemns even the clear case under present law
-performing an abortion to prevent the imminent and immediate
death of the mother-since one innocent life cannot be taken to
save another. The American Law Institute specifically rejected this
view at its 1959 meeting. 9
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States;
Honorable Sterry R. Waterman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
and currently president of the American Judicature Society; Dean Eugene
V. Rostow of Yale Law School; Professor Livingston Hall, representing
the Harvard Law School; Albert J. Harno, former dean of University
of Illinois Law School, former president of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the American Judicature
Society, and currently Administrative Director of the Illinois Judicial Sys-
tem; Honorable Laurance M. Hyde, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Missouri; Dean William B. Prosser of the University of California Law
School at Berkeley; the late Emory Brownell, former Executive Director
of the National Legal Aid Association; the late Karl N. Llewellyn; Glenn
R. Winters, Executive Director of the American Judicature Society; James
V. Bennett, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons since 1937; and a
number of deans of law schools not already mentioned, including the deans
of the two law schools of this state. Among the nationally prominent private
practitioners present at the meeting were Harrison Tweed of New York,
then president of the American Law Institute and former president of the
National Legal Aid Association; Norris Darrel of New York City, currently
president of the American Law Institute; William A. Schnader of Philadel-
phia, former president of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and of the National Association of Attorneys General
and prominently identified with the Uniform Commercial Code; and Albert
E. Jenner, Jr., of Chicago, past president of the American Judicature So-
ciety and of the American College of Trial Lawyers. See 36 ALI PROCEED-
INGS 1-26 (1959) (registration list).
138. See Doherty, Unborn's Life: A Right, Catholic Bull., Oct. 26, 1962,
p. 6. For a more extended discussion of this position see Quay, Justiliable
Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173 (1960).
139. See the following arguments made in support of a motion to delete
the provisions justifying therapeutic abortions from the Model Penal Code:
MR. QUAY: We stand in horror of totalitarianism as we see it
in different parts of the world. We reject the claim of any state that
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As Glanville Williams has pointed out, this approach is based
essentially on a religious interpretation and characterization of the
biological phenomenon of conception and development of the
embryo and fetus.14 Being so, it is not susceptible to either de-
monstrative proof or disproof. Those holding such views are cer-
tainly entitled to adhere to them, to live their lives accordingly,
and to be free from criticism or condemnation for doing so. This
is only in keeping with American tradition and constitutional prin-
ciple of freedom of religious thought and practice. The American
it has in its predisposition the lives of all of the people, or of any
single one of its people.
We were shocked by the slaughter of the Kulacks [sic], we were
shocked by the slaughter in the name of science at Dachau. We still
maintain the right of every individual as a human being to retain
his life as long as he is guiltless of any offense that would justify
taking it.
That is equally true for the child, and the child still in the womb,
in the case of a newly born child such as those in the days of my
youth were so commonly exposed by their mothers in China, in the
case of a child or in the case of an adult.
If the state wants to take the life of a human being at one stage,
it can take the life of that individual at any other stage. I can see
no difference, and I say the state does not have the authority and
it cannot give it to any two medical men or men licensed to practice
medicine.
After all, we [protect] minors, even those who have reached
the end of their 'teens who can speak for themselves and at least
assert their rights. Whether they defend them or not, we protect
them. We [require] guardianship to protect their rights even though we
are dealing only with property, not with their lives. But in this
unborn child, guilty of no offense, it has no part in that. That child
has done no wrong. It has simply followed the law of human nature,
growing in the womb, inoffensive, doing no harm to anyone, simply
waiting there patiently for the time when it will be ready to meet the
mother's love and venture on a full life among fellow men.
Instead, it will never meet that love, but will have that life snuffed
out before it has had a chance even to whimper a protest.
FATHER TEMPOLI [St. John's University School of Law]: I have
no illusion that I will be able to change the opinion of anyone in the
room on such a basic thing, but I think it would be weighing on my
conscience if I did not draw the attention of the American Law In-
stitute to the fact that we have evidence as to what happened in
Germany, and I think that we ought to be very much concerned by
the fact that the only difference that we make between the killing of
the healthy father of a family, and one who is a newborn child or
quickening or. recognizable, is either a feeling of sympathy with a
fellow human being or a decent opinion of a responsible group. If we
would rely upon either as the fundamental difference, the only basis
of our philosophy, then we soon go much farther than we intend to.
36 ALI PROCEEDINGS 261-64 (1959). The motion to delete the provisions
for theraneutic abortion was defeated.
140. WLIAMs, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRMIINAL LAW 225
(1957).
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Law Institute recommendations are consistent with this position;
they are permissive only. No woman need submit to an abortion
for any reason if her faith does not permit her to do so.
It is quite a different matter to insist that laws based on these
views be applicable to everyone, including persons not sharing
them.1"' Protestantism and the Jewish religion are not opposed to
therapeutic abortions. 42
The common law did not accept the proposition that human
141. A distinguished lawyer and civic leader of the Twin Cities put it
thus in a letter to the author:
Surely proposed Section 609.345, Subd. 6, on therapeutic abortion
will stir up much emotional argument. I notice that the present laws
which it will supersede can have the effect of compelling a woman
to give birth to a monster, or the child of an idiot who has raped
her. This is plain cruelty. It seems disgraceful to legislate it. Thus the
proposed section, allowing the mercy of a carefully regulated abor-
tion, comes as a ray of light in a dark attic chamber. I suppose much
of the opposition to it will be based on religious dogma. As we all
know, such dogma has made some bad law. One example is "The
Capitall Lawes of New-England" of 1641. (See Harvard Law School
Bulletin for February, 1956.) These laws provided a single penalty,
death, not only for murder and most sexual irregularities but also
for blaspheming or "worshipping any other God, but the Lord God"
or simply being a witch. Those who wrote these laws doubtless be-
lieved they were simply expressing what was the eternal and im-
mutable law of God. The laws themselves actually cited the passages
in the Old Testament on which they were based. What the authors
failed to see, and what many well meaning people today forget, is
that religious dogma is for all who freely accept it but not something
to be imposed by law on those who do not accept it.
142. See Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and
Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 123, 133 (1962):
Indications are that most contemporary Jewish Talmudic scholars do
not consider the present law too liberal, and by and large would not
strongly oppose a cautious broadening of the legal exception to the
abortion statute.
Protestantism, for the most part, though adhering to the restrictive
attitude of Christianity, is not opposed to the present exceptions to
the prohibitory law, and most Protestant authorities hold that term-
ination of pregnancy is not a problem for the church but should be
handled by the individual patient, her doctor and her clergyman, with
primary consideration being given the mother.
The Rev. Dr. Israel Margolies, Rabbi of Beth Am, the People's Temple,
in commenting on legalizing abortion to prevent the birth of deformed
babies, stated to his congregation:
The truly civilized mind would be hard put to devise a greater sin
than to condemn a helpless infant to the twilight world of living death,
or to sentence two innocent parents to a life term of caring for, yes,
and loving, a creature who is a grotesque mockery of God's image.
Is it not time that we matured sufficiently as a people to assert
once and for all that the sexual purposes of human beings and their
reproductive consequences are not the business of the state, but rather
free decisions to be made by husband and wife?
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18. 1962. § 1, p. 76, col. 3.
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life begins from the moment of conception for the purposes of
the law. An abortion was not treated as homicide for that rea-
son. 43 Neither does it appear to have been any other crime to
commit an abortion unless the child had quickened. 1" Es-
sentially the same position is taken in our present statutes as in-
dicated by the relatively light sentence authorized for abortion as
compared to those for homicide. The maximum imprisonment
authorized is-four years compared with life imprisonment for first
degree murder and 15 years for the lowest degree of homicide,
manslaughter in the second degree. Judged by the sentences per-
mitted, abortion is less serious than stealing 150 dollars worth of
property, 45 transporting a prostitute,"4 6 keeping a disorderly
house,147 committing perjury,111 abandoning a child or preg-
nant wife,"4 9 and much less serious than committing bribery,5 °
selling narcotics,"m or maiming another.5 2 To proceed on the
143. State v. Prude, 76 Miss. 543 (1898). The indictment charged that
the defendant "did feloniously kill and slay an unborn quick child of said
Emma Prude." The court stated:
This is not a good indictment at common law, for by the common
law, "an infant in the mother's womb, not being in rerum natura, is
not considered as a person who can be killed within the description
of murder, and, therefore, if a woman, being quick or great with
child, take any potion to cause an abortion, or if another give her
any such potion, or if a person strike her, whereby the child within
her is killed, it is not murder or manslaughter.
Id. at 544-45.
144. State v. Steadman, 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 91 (1948). See also
Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MODERN L. REv. 126
(1938). In Steadman, the court said:
At coinmon law, an abortion produced with the woman's consent,
was not a crime unless the woman was "quick with child," that is,
when the embryo had advanced to that degree of maturity where the
child had a separate and independent existence, and the woman has
herself felt the child alive and quick within her ....
"Life begins, in contemplation of law, as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb." 1 B1. Com. 129. As stated in
State v.-Cooper, 22 N.IL. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 248: "It is not material
whether, speaking with physiological accuracy, life may be said to
commence at the moment of quickening, or at the moment of con-
ception, or at some intervening period. In contemplation of law, life
commences at the moment of quickening, at that moment when the
embryo gives the first physical proof of life, no matter when it
first received it."
214 S.C. at 7, 51 S.E.2d at 93.
145. See MINN. STAT. § 622.06 (1961).
146. See MNN. STAT. § 617.325 (1961).
147. See MINN. STAT. § 617.30 (1961).
148. See MuNN. STAT. § 613.39 (1961).
149. See MnN. STAT. § 617.55 (1961).
150. See MNN. STAT. § 613.02 (1961).
151. S~e MINN. STAT.§ 618.21 (1961).
152. See MANN. STAT. § 619.30 (1961).
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premise that an abortion involves the taking of human life would
introduce a wholly new concept into our criminal law.
Without this concept, the reasons for permitting therapeutic
abortions as recommended by the American Law Institute are
most compelling. It only makes good sense to permit a physician,
by a relatively simple operation, to save a woman from mental
breakdown or grave physical impairment; this is probably the pres-
ent law. It makes equally good sense to prevent the birth of a
mentally or physically deformed child. Not only is this an act
of mercy to the child that would have been born, but to the moth-
er as well. The recent thalidomide incident demonstrates the shock,
dismay, and depression created in the mother on realizing the con-
dition of the child to which she has given birth. Some of the
mothers who were victims of this unfortunate incident attempted
suicide and others became insane. 53 It debases the dignity of women
and the whole concept of motherhood to compel a woman by law
to bear the child of a rapist or of her own father.15 4
There are, therefore, strong reasons to support the position of
the Advisory Committee in recommending the provision on ther-
apeutic abortion. It is not a large departure from what appears to
be the present law, it has the support of the leaders of the bench
and bar of the country, and humanitarian reasons support it.
This does not, however, warrant optimism that the provision
153. Where this is medically indicated as a prospect, the present law
as stated earlier in the text probably permits an abortion.
154. Many reputable doctors and hospitals faced with these pathetic sit-
uations have proceeded with the abortion in the face of laws prohibiting it.
See Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and
Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417 (1959). This takes no account of the other
and undoubtedly much larger number of such cases in which the abortion
was performed by a layman, often times under the most unsanitary con-
ditions. This led the grand jury of Los Angeles County, California, to
adopt a resolution in 1960 urging liberalization of the abortion laws of
California along the lines recommended by the American Law Institute.
The resolution of the jury is set out in Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abor-
tion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 123,
139 (1962).
Estimates of illegal abortions run from 300,000 to 2,000,000 a year.
Few of these would come under the provisions of the proposed change.
There was no intent on the part of the Advisory Committee to legalize
abortions except in those exceptional cases indicated by the recommenda-
tion.
Several letters from members of the bar support the position taken by
the Committee. Two criticized the proposed section as not being sufficient-
ly broad in allowing therapeutic abortions. Many others supported the re-
vision generally without specific mention of the section on abortion. Four
members of the bar criticized the section on the ground that it permitted
the taking of human life. Since these communications were written for
the consideration of the Committee only, names cannot be given.
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will find its way into the law of this state. At the final meeting
on January 4, 1963, the Committee decided to retain the recom-
mendations as they appear in the proposed code. But political
realities are such that strong and organized opposition is likely to
prevail. The nature of the subject is such that proponents of the
measure are not likely to be vocal or to organize for the purpose,
and those who would benefit by the proposal are future prospec-
tive mothers who cannot be known and cannot organize.
V. SENTENCING
Since the provisions relating to sentencing are quite fully ex-
plained in the comments appearing in the report of the Advisory
Committee, only a few supplementary remarks are warranted here.
A. OBJECTIVES
The proposed revision attempts to eliminate the confusion and
uncertainty now existing among the several sections of the present
code dealing with sentencing that are scattered over several chap-
ters. The provisions as originally adopted in the nineteenth century
were fairly simple, and the objective was the limited one of per-
mitting the judge to impose such sentence as the crime warranted.
The sentence of the court constituted little more than a reaction of
the judge to the crime and to the defendant in the course of the trial.
Sentence was to a penal institution and the court was not concern-
ed with what happened to the defendant once the sentence had
been imposed.
Since that time, this relatively simple structure has been changed
by new enactments that had a different objective-the rehabili-
tation of the convicted defendant. Hence, from time to time such
provisions have been enacted as the sentence to a reformatory for
the younger age group (16 to 30 years of age), the indetermi-
nate sentence, the parole of inmates, and the power conferred on
the court to suspend execution of a sentence of imprisonment and
place the defendant on probation. All these were superimposed on
earlier provisions without much effort directed at reconciliation.
The proposed code co-ordinates the duties of the court in impos-
ing sentence with those of the Department of Corrections in carry-
ing out the execution of the sentence so that both will be directing
their efforts toward common ends. Another objective is the dif-
ferentiation of those convicted persons who need no more than a
short term of imprisonment (or none at all) to insure both their
rehabilitation and the protection of the public, and those hardened,
professional, or unbalanced criminals who require long incarcera-
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tion for these purposes. By these means and by the procedures de-
scribed below, the Committee believed that the objectives and pur-
poses of the criminal law will be achieved more effectively.
B. PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND DIAGNOSTIC REPORT
The post-conviction procedure provided is a relatively simple
one and builds on principles with which judges and lawyers are
already familiar. If the defendant has been convicted of a
felony not requiring a life sentence of imprisonment and no stay
is asked for purposes of appeal,' the judge will order a pre-
sentence investigation and defer sentence until the report thereon
is returned. 5 The requirement is not only for the protection of
the defendant, but also for public assurance that the judge acts
upon the fullest information. Pending the investigation, the defend-
ant, if he is not on bail, may be committed to the Department of
Corrections until the judge is ready to impose sentence." 7 The
purpose is to avoid confining the defendant in a jail or other in-
adequate local facility pending the investigation. The period of
confinement, if any and wherever occurring, is credited toward
whatever sentence the judge imposes unless the judge orders other-
wise in fixing a term less than the maximum.' The judge
may also request a diagnostic study by the Department of Cor-
rections if he desires this type of information about the defendant.
In the event that the crime committed was one that carries a
maximum sentence of more than ten years, the defendant must be
referred to the Department of Corrections for such a diagnostic
study. Most of the crimes carrying such a sentence under the pro-
posed code involve serious offenses and usually are crimes of vio-
lence. Hence it is considered essential that the judge obtain the
fullest information about the character of the defendant and re-
ceive the recommendations of the Department before sentence is
imposed. This helps to identify the hardened or dangerous crimi-
nal who might not otherwise be revealed by the presentence re-
port."'59 The diagnostic study will not be available, however, un-
til facilities are provided by law to the Department. 10°
The reports given to the court as a result of the presentence
The Criminal Law Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Association
recently rejected a motion to delete the proposed section from the pro-
posed code and submit it as a separate bill.
155. See § 609.115(9).
156. § 609.115(1).
157. Ibid.
158. § 609.145(2).
159. § 609.115(2) (2)
160. § 609.115(2) (3).
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investigation and diagnostic study are open to the defendant's at-
torney and to the prosecuting attorney for inspection, except that
confidential sources of information are not to be disclosed unless
the court expressly so orders.' 6 ' If the defendant has no at-
torney, the court may either appoint one for him for the purpose
or permit the defendant himself to see the reports. Such appoint-
ment should be made whenever the judge considers it undesirable
or harmful to permit the defendant to inspect the reports.
Such disclosure of the investigation and diagnostic reports will
undoubtedly receive the general approval of the legal profession.
It conforms to the conceptions of fairness that permeate the judi-
cial system in insisting that state action against an individual should
be preceded by notice of the grounds of the proposed action and
an opportunity to be heard. 62 It is also an application of the
fundamental premise that our system accepts as axiomatic that the
truth is best ascertained when assertions are subjected to the scrutiny
and criticism of those affected. This does not imply fraud, dis-
honesty, chicanery, or incompetence; it recognizes a characteris-
tic of human nature. We are more careful and more accurate
about what we do and say if we know it will be examined, criti-
cized, and possibly refuted by those against whom it is directed."
A judge should be adequately and correctly informed in performing
such a vital function as the imposition of a sentence. Disclosure
of the reports help to assure this.
Some concern has been shown among those engaged in correc-
tional services that the effectiveness of the investigation and re-
port will be adversely affected if disclosure to the defendant or
his counsel is compelled.'6 It is feared that those who have the
needed information will not give it if confidentiality cannot be as-
sured, and that the report will be so cast as to render it less use-
ful to the judge. These are largely hypothetical fears not con-
firmed by experience in California, where disclosure is required, 65
161. § 609.115(5).
162. The notion that a convict has no rights except to a sentence that
stays within the statutory maximum is primarily a survival of the old
common-law punitive concept that a convict is an outcast of society to
be executed or banished, treated as civilly dead, and deprived of all civil
rights.
163. See State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 144, 370 P.2d 287, 290 (1962).
164. See Barnett & Gronewold, Confidentiality of the Presentence Re-
port, Federal Probation, March 1962, p. 26; Sharp, The Confidential Na-
ture of Presentence Reports, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 127 (1955).
165. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203. Communications received from California
confirm the statement in the text. Some other states also require disclosure.
ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 23 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.06 (Anderson
1953); VA. CODE § 53-278.1 (1958).
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or in those courts that, by way of discretion, uniformly make
the report accessible to counsel. What is more likely is a high-
er and more professional level of investigation and report, and a
greater mutual respect and cooperative effort between counsel and
probation officer than is possible when the report is treated as
a confidential document known only to the officer and the judge.
If either the prosecution or the defendant desires to be heard
on any matter contained in the reports, the proposed revision pro-
vides that the court may conduct a summary hearing in chambers
immediately or defer the matter to a later time if it so desires.?'
Following the hearing, the judge is free to impose such sentence
as the law permits. There is no requirement that he make findings.
Evidence at the summary hearing need not conform to the usual
rules of evidence. Nothing in the nature of an adversary proceeding
is contemplated.
C. FORM OF SENTENCE
A sentence of imprisonment for a felony for more than one
year must be made to the Commissioner of Corrections who de-
termines where the defendant will be confined. 6 ' The present
law permits transfer between the state prison and the reforma-
tory;1 68 the proposed provision permits transfer to any facility
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.' Sen-
tence for a felony may be for less than a year, and if it is, the
crime is considered a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor depend-
ing on the sentence imposed. 170
The judge may place the defendant on probation on terms de-
termined by him without imposing a sentence of any kind.17'
This procedure is new to Minnesota although it is not uncommon
in other states. It gives the judge a more substantial basis upon
which to act should the defendant's probation be revoked and
sentence then imposed. The court may still continue the present
practice of imposing sentence but deferring execution while the
defendant is on probation.
It will be noted that confidential sources of information need not be dis-
closed unless ordered by the court. § 609.115(5). Also, disclosure is made
to the defendant's attorney, and if he has none, the court is to appoint
one for the purpose unless the court concludes that it would not be detri-
mental to make the disclosure to the defendant. Ibid. It then becomes the
responsibility of the attorney whether or not he will advise his client of
the contents of the report.
166. § 609.115(5).
167. § 609.105.
168. MINN. STAT. § 243.77 (1961).
169. § 609.105(2).
170. § 609.13.
171. § 609.135(1).
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If probation is revoked under the proposed provisions, the de-
fendant must be advised in writing as to the reasons for the
revocation and given an opportunity at a summary hearing to take
issue with the charge that he violated the terms of his proba-
tion. 72 If he has complied with those terms, he is entitled to
remain on probation. The reverse is true of the present law.'
The arbitrary power to terminate the liberty of even a convicted
person on probation was deemed undesirable. A number of other
states have similar provisions and their number is increasing.
D. PAROLE
As under present law, the Adult Corrections Commission may
parole a defendant committed to imprisonment at any time un-
less the sentence is for life imprisonment for murder.' The
Commission, however, must grant parole within five years to
those convicted of a crime carrying a maximum permissible sen-
tence of not more than ten years. The Commission need not grant
parole, however, if it determines, with or without a hearing, that
parole would not be conducive to the defendant's rehabilitation or
would not be in the public interest.' 5 The purpose of this provision
is to emphasize the desirability of early release for those who are not
dangerous criminals and to promote a greater degree of uniformity
in the parole of such inmates. The requirement is not extended to
those who have been convicted of a crime carrying a maximum pos-
sible sentence of more than ten years. In these cases, as already
seen, a diagnostic study will have been made prior to sentence
and the dangerous offenders identified at that time. The Commis-
sion, therefore, should not be encouraged by a directive contained
in the law to pursue a policy of early release in these cases. As
earlier stated, the policy is to differentiate between the danger-
ous and the casual criminal.
E. HABITUAL OFFENDERS
The proposed revision departs substantially from present sec-
tions that deal with habitual offenders. The present law under-
takes, by a procedure analogous to that of a criminal prosecution,
to identify the chronic offender and authorize increased sentences
of imprisonment depending upon the number of prior convic-
tions. 6 Their objective is sound, but the manner in which they
172. § 609.14(2).
173. See MNN. STAT. § 610.39 (1961).
174. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
175. § 609.12(2).
176. The principal statutes are MINN. STAT. §§ 610.28, .32 (1961).
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operate has been subject to criticism. They apply mechanically,
depending upon the existence of a single fact-a prior convic-
tion. Not all persons with prior convictions are chronic offenders,
and to treat them as such results in unnecessarily severe and un-
fair sentences in many instances. Also, the present provisions have
been applied very unevenly. In some counties, they are regularly
invoked, while in others they are not; thus, whether an offender
is to receive the longer sentence authorized depends in part on
the county in which he happens to commit the offense.
The revision emphasizes the necessity of identifying the defend-
ant as a dangerous criminal not only on the basis of the prior con-
viction, but on all of the information obtainable about his charac-
ter and disposition.' A prior conviction is still required, for
this gives some assurance against improper application of the law.
Prior conduct will have been established by a plea of guilty or
by a jury trial in which established procedural protections have
been afforded. The prior conviction must be for a felony commit-
ted within ten years prior to the crime for which sentence is
being imposed. Misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors have not
been included, for acts of this character are not believed of suf-
ficient gravity to warrant the application of the proposed law.' 8
The procedure provided in the revision is relatively simple. In-
stead of an information charging prior convictions, the proceed-
ing is initiated by written notice to the defendant given either by
the prosecuting attorney or by order of the court.' In addition
to the presentence investigation, there must be a diagnostic study
and report made by the Department of Corrections. If the defend-
ant requests, a summary hearing is held. Trial by jury is no long-
er provided. The court itself must make the findings that the de-
fendant was previously convicted of a felony and that he is "dis-
posed to the commission of criminal acts of violence and that an
extended term of imprisonment is required for his rehabilitation
or for the public safety."' 0 This procedure is constitutionally
permissible since it assures that the defendant is given both no-
tice of the grounds on which the sentence is proposed to be in-
creased and an opportunity to be heard. A criminal trial is not re-
quired.18
177. §§ 609.115, .16.
178. For the present provisions concerning misdemeanors involving mor-
al turpitude, see MINN. STAT. § 617.75 (1961). There are also special sec-
tions applicable to particular crimes. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 617.22, 621.37
(1961).
179. § 609.16.
180. § 609.16(4).
181. Levell v. Simpson, 142 Kan. 892, 52 P.2d 372 (1936); State v.
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If the required facts are found, the court is authorized to in-
crease the sentence by the maximum sentence authorized by law
for the crime committed multiplied by the number of prior con-
victions. However, the sentence may not exceed 40 years) 8 2
F. REVISIONS CONCERNING MISDEMEANORS AND GROSS MfIS-
DEMEANORS
Very little change is introduced by the proposed revision with
respect to sentences for misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors. The
Advisory Committee at one time approved giving the trial court
power to commit a defendant convicted of a gross misdemeanor
to a state penal institution. However, after hearing from the rep-
resentatives of these institutions and the Department of Correc-
tions about the difficulties this would create for them since their fa-
cilities are geared to longer-term confinements, it was concluded that
this measure was not feasible, much as it might be desired by the
trial judges of the state. Committing individuals to county jails and
other local facilities in their prevailing condition is indeed an un-
desirable alternative to permitting them to remain at large. But
the remedy must lie in measures not within the purview of the
revision-for example, regional workhouses or workfarms un-
der the supervision of the Department of Corrections.
The Advisory Committee was also aware of the inadequacy of
the fine of 100 dollars now provided as the maximum fine for
a misdemeanor, but felt no change could be recommended in the
criminal code. Any increase in the permissible fine would have to
be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the jurisdiction of
municipal courts and justices of the peace." Otherwise, these
crimes could only be prosecuted in the district court. A change in
the jurisdiction of these courts presents problems of lower court
reorganization that clearly were not within the compass of the Ad-
visory Committee's responsibilities. Any improvement in this area
must await independent legislative consideration. The inability, re-
sulting from the present situation, to make any improvements
with regard to sentences for misdemeanors emphasizes the need
for such consideration.
Guidry, 169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929); State v. Morton, 338 S.W.2d
858 (Mo. 1960). See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1961); Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). Contra, State v. Furth, 5 Wash. 2d 1, 104 P.2d
925 (1940).
182. § 609.155(1).
183. Justices of the peace "have power to hold a court . . . to hear,
try, and determine all charges for offenses arising within their respective
counties where the punishment prescribed by law does not exceed a fine
of $100.00 or imprisonment for three months." MINN. STAT. § 633.02(1961). Similar jurisdiction is conferred on municipal courts under the gen-
eral municipal court act. MINN. STAT. § 488.04(5)(a)(1) (1961).
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